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Notes from the Editor 
 
In this edition of Homeland Security Affairs we are pleased to offer articles that 
demonstrate the increasing depth and breadth of the homeland security discipline. 
This growth is particularly apparent in “Changing Homeland Security: The Year in 
Review – 2007,” where Christopher Bellavita asked homeland security professionals to 
identify what they thought was the discipline’s top issue last year. The responses range 
from intelligence to ethics and trust, public health, immigration, and the Department of 
Homeland Security. Each respondent expresses his or her particular viewpoint of what 
homeland security is and should be. 
Addressing the question of ethics and homeland security, John Kaag examines the way 
in which technological progress has altered the rules of military engagement and 
influenced the implementation of homeland security. In “Another Question Concerning 
Technology,” Kaag argues that the technology associated with precision guided 
munitions (PGM) opens the possibility of ethical discrimination and proportionality, but 
in no way ensures that these possibilities will be actualized.  He asks if the technological 
progress that has come to define homeland security may lead to similar ethical 
difficulties in fields of domestic intelligence and law enforcement. Finally, Kaag suggests 
that these ethical questions are neither answered nor obscured by the development of 
technology.  It is only the unreflective use of, and dependence on, these technologies 
that may be ethically problematic. 
In “Evaluating the Impact of Contextual Background Fusion on Unclassified Homeland 
Security Intelligence,” Chuck Eaneff addresses the challenges of providing unclassified 
intelligence products to homeland security professionals who are considered non-
traditional recipients (NTR). Eaneff examines the impact of intelligence contextual 
background fusion (CBF) through the use of hyperlink technology and evaluates the 
likelihood of these NTRs accepting this technology. Based on surveys using DHS and 
FBI customer satisfaction questions in combination with a Technology Acceptance 
Model, he contends these non-traditional recipients overwhelmingly prefer a contextual 
background fusion product. 
Turning to another model of intelligence and collaboration, Larry Irons analyzes 
significant terrorist plots in the United Kingdom using a heuristic model of prevention – 
the Prevention Cube. The analysis presented in “Recent Patterns of Terrorism 
Prevention in the United Kingdom” focuses on the way collaboration and information 
sharing practices among UK Agencies affected the success of counterterrorism strategy 
in key successful and preempted attack plots. Irons contends that, historically, the 
dominant UK strategy has focused on the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and 
so has employed a primarily hierarchical, rather than a networked, model of risk 
management in prioritizing surveillance targets. For this reason, the Agencies in the UK 
failed to take into account the ability of a networked organization, such as al Queda, to 
direct the harmful actions of home-grown extremists. 
 
How the United States prepares for and responds to risk is the topic of Richard A. 
Posner’s book, Catastrophe: Risk and Response, reviewed by Patrick S. Roberts. Posner 
analyzes the reasons why the U.S. under-prepares for natural, technological, and 
terrorist catastrophe. This is, according to Roberts, “a central work in the burgeoning 
literature on how to deal with rare but high-consequence events.” Posner’s use of cost-
benefit analysis, says Roberts, provides a starting point for how the Department of 
Homeland Security might allocate resources among threats to create an all hazards 
approach to managing the risk of catastrophe. 
 
We hope you find this article in this issue of Homeland Security Affairs informative and 
thought-provoking and encourage you to contribute your own thoughts on the most 
important homeland security issues of the past year. 
 
The Editor 
Changing Homeland Security: The Year In Review – 2007 
Christopher Bellavita 
 
As New York City and the nation prepared to remember the sixth anniversary of 
the 2001 terrorist attacks, the talk started about September 11th fatigue: “a 
weariness of reliving a day that everyone wishes had never happened.”  
“I may sound callous, but doesn’t grieving have a shelf life?” one person asked. 
“We’re very sorry and mournful that people died, but there are living people. Let’s 
wind it down.”1 
That gets my vote for 2007’s most startling homeland security story. 
One gets startled when something happens one was not expecting. Perhaps I 
should not have been so surprised. 
I spoke with a lot of thoughtful homeland security professionals last year. In 
December I asked many of them to answer two questions:2 
• From your perspective – and using whatever criteria you like – what 
would you say was a top homeland security-related story or issue in 
2007? 
• And, in 25 words or less, why? 
Their responses present a snapshot of Homeland Security 2007 as captured by 
people who work with and think about these issues all year. Their ideas remind 
us of the continuing debate about the meaning, scope, and effect of homeland 
security. Not every important topic or trend is mentioned.3 What is cited, 
however, outlines the still emerging terrain of homeland security.   
Intelligence – arguably the core of preventing another major attack – was a 
significant issue in 2007. Several national intelligence estimates and related 
products revealed more information about “the threat” and about how the 
intelligence community does its work. Unsurprisingly, the more one knows about 
this element of the nation’s security, the more questions are raised. Can we rely 
on the accuracy and objectivity of intelligence generated by government? How 
does intelligence actually help the nation be better prepared? What goes on inside 
the more than forty fusion centers across the country? Who is watching what they 
do? 
Do you recall Andrew Speaker and what he taught the nation about 
preparedness? 
Did the behavior of James B. Comey (revealed last year) demonstrate anything 
about ethics, courage, and loyalty in homeland security? 
What about the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development trial?  Are 
there any lessons to be learned there about whether the United States 
Constitution is a “suicide pact” or an effective strategy for making sure the nation 
remains secure? 
Speaking of strategies, have you had the chance to read the “updated” National 
Strategy for Homeland Security? What did you think about it? What do you plan 
to do differently because of it? 
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School shootings, mall shootings, gang shootings, a bridge collapse, wild-land 
fires, one fake news conference – are these homeland security concerns? Should 
they be? 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had neither spectacular 
successes nor dramatic failures in 2007.4 As the Bush era in homeland security 
enters its final year, DHS continues to search for organizational coherence. We 
were cautioned when DHS began in 2003 that it took the Department of Defense 
half a century to find its coherence. Does the nation have the patience to wait that 
long? 
On the other hand, do most Americans even think about homeland security?  
We have not been successfully attacked since 2001. Although jurisdictions have 
to write harder, they still get homeland security grants. Air travelers routinely 
complain about the Transportation Safety Administration’s (TSA) “security 
theater.”5 Immigration and border security are political fodder. Al Qaeda has 
“regenerated” its capabilities. While the military part of the surge in Iraq appears 
to be succeeding, southwest Asia swirls further into disorder. Arrests at Fort Dix, 
New Jersey, and trials in Miami and Los Angeles raise questions about the nature 
of a homegrown terrorist threat.6 
In early January 2008, a New York Times editorial castigated presidential 
candidates for not focusing more attention on homeland security.7 One can only 
think candidates would be talking more about homeland security if it were 
important to voters. 
Although I did not ask, several respondents predicted what might be a top 
issue in 2008. We will check back next year to see how prescient they were. 
In the meantime, we offer the following thoughts for your consideration. I 
hope something here startles you. 
 
THE NATURE OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
The biggest issue in Homeland Security in FY '07 was the re-
emergence of Emergency Management and the subsequent 
subjugation of homeland security. The idea of homeland security as 
a discipline, that it is a system of systems, responsible for risk 
management in a jurisdiction, was greatly set back. The resurgence 
of emergency management has greatly slowed the progress that was 
made on getting the individual disciplines (fire, law enforcement, 
public health, infrastructure protection, EMS, public works, 
medical (physicians, nurses and hospitals), communications, 
intelligence, agriculture etc.) involved in homeland security to look 
at themselves as a part of a greater whole. Homeland Security 
appears to have regressed back to its previous 9/11 state of stove 
piped planning and possibly response. 
 – Former Senior DHS official 
 
Your question implies selecting from the homeland security issues 
that the media brought to our attention, of which there are many to 
choose from. I don’t feel that any of these are actually “top” issues 
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but rather what will sell papers and sway public opinion. The big 
issue for me is the sustainability of our national homeland security 
approach. Events, the reporting of events and our response to 
events swing like a pendulum over time. When something happens, 
we get up in arms and will do anything to fix it, then time passes 
and we don’t see why we’re paying for all this homeland security 
stuff. I can’t see how we can sustain a legitimate National Strategy 
for Homeland Security under these conditions. But what to do 
about it? 
If you’re asking what top issue was reported in the media, I’d say 
the immigration one worries me the most, particularly because it 
flies in the face of so many other aspects of our culture. It would be 
easy to lock down the border (relatively anyway) if that didn’t have 
enormous other sociopolitical and economic impacts that we don’t 
want. Personally I find the “build a fence” approach to be so 
simpleminded I have to laugh.  
– Rudolph P. Darken 
 
Aside from the continuing erosion of over 200 years of tested 
constitutional law that has protected and defended the citizens of 
this nation, I would consider the collapse of the bridge in St. Paul, 
Minnesota to be the top story. I find it a metaphor for neglecting 
our foundations on so many levels. We need to educate the 
American people that terrorism does not always come with an 
explosion; it can come with a collapse.  
– Homeland Security researcher 
 
In 2007, we saw the continued erosion of leaders to persuade 
Americans that we still face a terrorist threat to the United States. 
Few believe terrorism will ever pose an existential threat to the 
United States, despite the new National Strategy on Homeland 
Security declaring that terrorists are intent on "destroying our way 
of life". 
During 2007, Americans continued to put the images of 9-11 
behind them. We end 2007 a more complacent people than we 
began the year. We are fatigued – tired of being scared. We are 
determined to be normal again. 
Yet, 2007 was a year when almost all analysts acknowledged that 
al Qaeda and its affiliates have regrouped and when law 
enforcement in Europe and America recognized that homegrown 
radicalization is occurring more rapidly and with fewer indicators. 
It was also a year where our preoccupation with Iraq continued 
to deflect us from effectively countering the broader terrorist 
ideological appeal. As a result, the number of global jihadists grew 
as we failed to engage "hearts and minds." 
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2008 will be a transition year. The political campaigns will likely 
reinforce our preoccupation with domestic concerns - the economy, 
health care, education, and other issues. We will be challenged to 
avoid turning more inward. Whether we end 2008 even more 
complacent than we began will depend, in large part, on who we 
elect the next president and whether we can regain our sense of 
purpose, align our values with our actions, and collaborate with 
international partners toward policies of inclusion.  
– Mike Walker 
 
I would offer the ever-expanding/evolving view of the discipline 
itself as the top homeland security issue of 2007. This relates to our 
frequent inquiry regarding what should be viewed a homeland 
security issue and if an issue or incident is deemed non-homeland 
security related, what criteria was used to make such a 
determination. Bridge collapse, school shootings, international 
security concerns (Secretary Chertoff recently stated he spends 
most of his time on the international aspects of homeland security), 
federally-funded fusion centers involved in domestic non-terrorism 
related criminal activities, California wildfires, etc. Continued lack 
of definition regarding what the discipline entails could have 
significant negative affects in the future: security (too many issues 
not given proper focus), economic (Congressional and state leaders 
manipulating expanded funding vehicles to pay for politically 
popular projects but have little affect on the strategic security 
environment), and international security ramifications (future 
enemies not aligned with or bound by traditional state entities. Is 
this a national and/or homeland security concern? Should 
homeland security continue to be viewed as a separate but 
necessarily conjoined discipline from that of national security?) 
Where might the current mindset of categorizing all activities that 
have the possibility of affecting national safety or security concerns 
take us in the future? 
A corollary to the 2007 to 2008 story is a current slate of 
presidential candidates rarely discussing homeland security issues. 
Is this based on the unique nature of the presidential election 
environment or the candidates’ lack of interest or understanding of 
homeland security? What little has been discussed by the 
candidates has been universal agreement that federal homeland 
security efforts are not working. However, no specifics are given 
regarding what should be done to address the perceived problems. 
Projection: Top HS related story of 2008. Response and recovery 
actions and new programs and policies related to a significant cyber 
security related issue.  
– John Rollins 
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I wouldn’t limit this issue to the year 2007 as I see a growing trend 
since the creation of DHS five years ago. It seems to me that the 
inability to clearly define the concept of “homeland security” serves 
a very useful purpose and consequently that there is little interest in 
clearly defining the concept (and hence we are not likely to see the 
issue of defining this concept resolved anytime soon). Clearly, DHS 
is not interested in a definition that might limit its scope and 
consequently it argues for the broadest definition possible in order 
to allow it to choose which areas will fall under its purview. This, of 
course, is normal bureaucratic behavior and hardly surprising.  
However, the more interesting process that appears to be occurring 
is that in which Homeland Security is proving to be a vehicle for the 
strengthening of the powers and influence of the federal 
government at the expense of state and local governments. The 
concentration of significant funds in the hands of DHS, and the 
dispersing of significant funding to state and local authorities, has 
enabled the federal government to attempt to remake state and 
local institutions in its image (or at least along the lines of its 
priorities). If there are data to support this argument, then this 
should prove to be an interesting chapter in the ongoing saga of the 
struggle for influence and sovereignty between state and local 
government on the one hand and the federal government on the 
other – a struggle that has been so central to American history and 
the evolution of this country. 
Five years after the creation of DHS, we are in the midst of a mad 
scramble to define homeland security in the absence of any major 
terrorist attacks to date (after all, DHS was created in the wake of 
9/11 and not because of hurricanes). The concept of “dual use” has 
become the mantra while the concept of homeland security has 
been stretched to include, in addition to terrorism and natural 
disasters, issues (in their non-terrorist context) such as illegal 
immigration, maritime safety, cyber security, criminal activity, etc. 
 – Homeland Security scholar 
 
I would say a top issue is the renewal of the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security in October.  It solidified the direction we are 
going in, confirmed that we have adopted an all hazards approach, 
and set into motion the Homeland Security Management System 
(which, frankly, I’m not sure will fly). 
 – Stan Supinski 
 
I think a general malaise is afflicting the public and media about 
homeland security. We seem, as a nation, to have gotten past 
Katrina and blaming FEMA for all our woes. We’ve moved into a 
new phase of understanding the relationship between the Feds 
(FEMA) and major incidents. The general citizenry does not know 
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this, or care to know it, but the "New FEMA" is out there and it’s 
working. 
The state of security of the homeland for the average "Joe" is 
good. There has been no major catastrophic disaster this year or the 
past few years for that matter. Iraq seems to be turning around and 
the media are not as concentrated on finding a villain as they once 
were. The major incidents, wildfires and the recent winter storms 
and power outages in the Midwest, did not stir a large or continuing 
barrage of media attention. Even the FEMA mock news conference 
did not hold media attention for too long.  
Perhaps it is the impending election in 2008 or the fact that the 
long dreaded attack has not taken place as of yet. Homeland 
Security seems to have fallen into a "lull." This may be the biggest 
issue at the end of 2007.   
– Vincent J. Doherty 
 
From my perspective the top issue is the debate over protection vs. 
resilience. There have been no major natural disasters, no domestic 
terrorist events, and no major improvements to the resiliency of 
domestic public safety and homeland security systems. We have, 
since 9/11, spent probably over five trillion (yes with a “T”) overseas 
on the war against terrorism and have yet to top 100 billion in 
domestic preparedness. Is the war succeeding, are we protected?  
One has to say yes. Are we a more resilient nation? One has to say 
no. We are at the point where we have spent the money 
domestically on the small things.  But in order to take it to the next 
level we have to really spend on infrastructure. Interoperable 
communications, improved power grids systems, improved health 
networks, water systems, etc. are the real challenges and we are 
kidding ourselves that our lack of investment in these areas and the 
continued flow of trillions outside our borders is the only correct 
formula.  
– Michael Byrne 
 
Several issues come to mind as candidates for the top spot. 
Immigration continues to be an important issue, infringements on 
civil liberties in this country and elsewhere concern many, and 
cyber-warfare is more visible. In the broader view, perhaps the 
most important shift is the greater emphasis on all-hazards if it 
signals a long-run shift in political and civic will. It is the latter that 
has the potential to significantly alter the emphasis or drive 
homeland policy and public involvement in new directions.  
– Robert Josefek 
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Lack of focus and priority for homeland security and the resources 
it needs, by elected and appointed senior officials. In a word – 
apathy. 
We have opportunities to visit with, see and hear lots of senior 
officials among the full spectrum of functional areas in states and 
major cities. That is where I see the apathy. As best I can tell they 
are trying to get a fix on the actual "threat," and then relate that to 
the scarce resources available to prepare for the wide array of "what 
ifs" they face. They primarily look to homeland security officials 
(state and local) to find funding sources for those needs. For the 
most part, they believe that, if there is a threat or a public safety 
need, the “Feds” should fund it. 
Conversely, I do not see, feel or hear that kind of apathy from the 
"average citizen" who I talk with as I travel the country. They are 
glad that the resources (wherever they come from) are applied to 
the threat and grateful that we have not suffered another "9/11." It 
is rare that I talk to anyone in the hinterlands, restaurants, 
airplanes, businesses of every kind and size, etc. who are not 
pleased with their personal safety and faith in the "government" 
(generic) to protect us. Rarely does anyone question the expense 
involved in maintaining or increasing that level of protection. It 
may also seem to them that it comes without cost. If there is a 
question about “terrorism” it is only about the national resources 
(human and fiscal) being expended on the “war in Iraq.” 
It is a conundrum: The officials say, "My constituents want better 
education for the kids, safer streets and neighborhoods, and better, 
cheaper healthcare." Homeland security wouldn't make the officials' 
Top 10 list of concerns   
Simultaneously, "the constituents" are satisfied with the 
"government's" programs for protecting us from another 9-11. It's 
almost like that is a given and… it is "free." The other stuff costs 
money.  
When you combine the two different but complimentary views, 
apathy quickly follows, especially among those elected to public 
office.  
– Vince Cable 
 
The biggest issue with homeland security this past year has been its 
identity crisis. What is homeland security anyway? Where are we 
going with it? As I travel, I am always amazed that the average 
citizen really believes the extent of homeland security is the 
effectiveness (or lack) of the TSA screener at the airport. 
Additionally, they believe that when it comes down to it, homeland 
security is really just a political issue to justify the current 
administration’s policies. I don’t believe they really think much 
about homeland security. That is the problem. 
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We haven't been able to "show them the money."  Exactly what 
has been built after six years? It would make such a difference if the 
average citizen knew that homeland security has become a part of 
the fabric of our local, state, and federal institutions. A large part of 
the problem is due to lack of leadership. I don't think the vision for 
homeland security has been articulated in a way that people can 
understand. All they see are the headlines and reports that show 
that DHS is the worst place to work with the lowest morale. If the 
citizens knew their local police chief was networked across the 
country with FBI, NYPD, DC public health, they would understand 
this concept and perhaps support homeland security as a long-term 
solution, not just a federal institution.  
I believe 2008 will be a pivotal year for homeland security as the 
election rolls on. How will the Democrats and Republicans 
articulate their vision for homeland security? Will it be political 
fodder used by the candidates to get elected? Will they just simplify 
the issues for their gain? Will they blame everything that is wrong 
on DHS or will someone be able to lead us to what is next? In only a 
few years, a foundation has been built for this discipline. Tens of 
thousands of Americans have been a part of building it. We need a 
leader who understands that and can lead us to what is next.  
– Homeland Security administrator 
 
The "homeland" we are securing is not a building or bridge but our 
way of life, the Constitution and the protections it provides. The 
issue/story for me was clearly expressed by a former federal cabinet 
official when he spoke at a conference I attended. To paraphrase the 
point that struck me, he said we can either have security or we can 
have freedoms.  It seems to me his "either/or" thinking is an excuse 
for an extraordinary array of activities that are an assault on the 
"homeland."  The question/issue/challenge is how can we have 
security and enhance our "homeland"?  
– Tom Mastre 
 
INTELLIGENCE 
It seems to me in 2007 there was a lot of interest in intelligence: 
how we collect it, how it is shared, what is legal, what is ethical. I 
find this interesting as a "next stage" of homeland security.  
Without any direct attacks in the U.S., we've had time to step back 
from the hysteria and look at the more long-range implications of 
what we are doing.  
– Editor working in the field of Homeland Security 
 
The top issue was politically independent intelligence analysis.  The 
November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's Nuclear 
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Intentions and Capabilities demonstrates a readiness by the U.S. 
intelligence community to offer politically independent – even 
politically unwelcome – analysis. Whether this NIE's specific 
findings are accurate or not, the community's assertion of analytical 
independence and professionalism is an important contribution to 
the ability of the political process to realistically engage risks to the 
nation. 
– Private sector Homeland Security executive. 
 
There were two issues: 
1) Information Sharing:  Absence of a continuum of intelligence 
support within the national homeland security network.  The reason 
for this includes different definitions of intelligence, lack of 
doctrine, need for focused intelligence skills, and leadership at state 
and local levels. 
2) 2007 Homeland Security Threat Assessment:  For the first 
time in six years a viable intelligence estimate has been produced.  
It provided strategic intelligence about the threat of terrorism to the 
homeland.  However, it was neither well distributed nor understood 
(for reasons related to #1 above).  
– Robert Simeral 
 
One issue that got my attention was Secretary Chertoff’s quote 
about “I have a gut feeling” that something was going to happen.  
His remarks made me reflect on the status of our intelligence. The 
one thing that would have prevented 9-11 was the flow and sharing 
of intelligence. We had the information on the terrorists and should 
have prevented the attacks. Six years later, we have a huge DHS 
with a huge budget but are still struggling to fix the federal 
intelligence bureaucracy, which is the one thing, and maybe only 
thing, that we had to do to prevent the 9-11 attacks. Ironically, I do 
believe the state and local intelligence is much better off today than 
six years ago.  
– Homeland Security executive 
 
I would say the release of The National Strategy for Information 
Sharing in October was a monumental event in history.  
Historically the intelligence community has been built from a need-
to-know versus a need-to-share perspective and the release of the 
NSIS shows a marked divergence from deep roots within this 
community. The release of a public strategy documenting a 
commitment to developing a resolution and acceptance of the 
importance in aggregating information, analyzing and then sharing 
back intelligence with all partners involved at state, local, tribal as 
well as federal levels seemed to me to be a ground-breaking 
strategic statement. Of course the proof is in the pudding and we 
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will see if the agencies identified as key leaders in the coordination 
can execute on the vision.  
– Homeland Security technologist 
 
A few issues come immediately to mind including the immigration 
debate and sustainability of programs as funding is reduced. I think 
both of these may become more important in 2008. For 2007 I 
think it must be the growing skepticism about, and the 
politicalization of, the intelligence function. How the intelligence 
community handles this crisis is significant not only for them but 
also for practicing prevention.  
I am not an intelligence wonk but I was on the receiving end of 
intelligence reports from the DHS and FBI while I was with a major 
metropolitan police department. I must say that most of the reports 
were not that helpful. But the reports and warnings did cause us to 
stop, talk, and act in a preventative manner. It re-directed our 
attention, if only for a short while, back on the question of 
homeland security. Are the officers carrying their protective 
equipment? Have we drilled on this scenario and when? Do they 
know what to look for and what to report? When was the last time 
we talked with our private partners about security concerns? How 
can we integrate actions that may prevent this type of attack into 
our daily business of policing? 
I have no idea if the intelligence was good or if we helped to 
prevent a terrorist attack but in some ways those questions are 
insignificant. The point was that we took intelligence and 
operationalized it and did so with the intent to help prevent an 
attack. This approach is gaining hold in policing. Intelligence-led 
policing has been around since the late nineties but just recently it 
is beginning to take hold. Crime data, crime prediction, and 
intelligence from human sources are driving some crime fighting 
strategies. 
My concern is that as the intelligence function becomes the 
nightly meal of pundits that analysts and agencies will withdraw 
back into their shell. State and local agencies will stop demanding 
more and meaningful intelligence. Executives will go back to ‘gut 
feelings’ and regular policing.  In essence, intelligence is dismissed 
as useless and suspect. More significant, prevention, as an 
important and meaningful activity for government agencies, will be 
seen as a luxury and ineffective – until the next time.  
2007 was when the curtain was pulled and we saw what was 
behind the wizards of intelligence. Yes there may be some smoke 
and mirrors as there are in every profession. The question now is 
whether the wizards will stand and fight for their craft and its 
importance or will we go back to the American way of waiting, 
denying, and reacting.   
– Nola Joyce 
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I think a very real issue concerns the future of fusion centers.  They 
have reached a kind of a tipping point in 2007, where they will 
either start to demonstrate real ongoing value and become 
institutionalized, or they will rapidly fade away.  They have 
tremendous potential, but as yet, with relatively few exceptions, 
they have not fully realized that potential, and the next twelve to 
eighteen months will be crucial if they are to survive.  This is an 
area of substantial concern at the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, the Department of Homeland Security, and the 
Department of Justice.   
– David Kaufman 
 
In my opinion, the top homeland security related issue of the year 
involved the fundamental question of how to balance the focus of 
state and local fusion centers on all hazards, including traditional 
crime prevention goals, on the one hand, and terrorism prevention 
goals on the other hand. 
 – Larry R. Irons 
 
I believe the role and function of fusion centers is – or will be – the 
top story for 2008.  I get the sense (especially from the Los Angeles 
Police Department and the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department) that 
we will have to come up with a viable product and some measure of 
success very soon, or the interest and participation level will 
seriously wane.   
– Patrick Miller 
 
ETHICS AND TRUST  
The May 2007 revelation that the executive branch, via Andrew 
Card and Alberto Gonzales, attempted to pressure the Justice 
Department into approving the National Security Agency (NSA) 
domestic surveillance program was a clarifying moment. Why?  
Even though it happened three years prior to the testimony by 
James Coomey, the revelation showed three things: the Justice 
Department had leaders willing to block constitutionally 
questionable activities; some in the administration were convinced 
the ends justified the means; and the top people in Justice were 
willing to resign over the tactics. The means/ends argument, then 
and now, is a rationalization framework that allows well-meaning 
people to take actions that threaten liberties. The strength shown by 
Justice leaders was very surprising and refreshing.  
– William V. Pelfrey Sr. 
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For me the top issue is the revelation of the CIA destroying 
interrogation tapes of high value detainees at Guantanamo. Why?  
It undercuts confidence in the honesty and integrity of our 
intelligence community and probably extends upwards to the 
pressures they may have gotten from higher-level administrators.  
It means I can no longer trust what my government officials report 
about aspects of their alleged War on Terror.  
– Phil Zimbardo 
 
The torture debate that raged in the late summer and early fall was 
to my mind the most momentous homeland security related story. 
It fundamentally called into question the integrity and benevolence 
of the "us" in our carefully constructed "us versus them" narrative. 
In isolation it merely created a brief value vacuum. In conjunction 
with all the other things that are going on (e.g., warrantless 
wiretaps, detentions, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.), I think the torture 
debate might have affected people's understanding of homeland 
security on a pretty fundamental level. Moral issues are not dead, 
especially not when they feed into folk’s fear of Big Brother – which 
is what homeland security is to most people. And there will always 
be politicians ready to stand up for the ignorance of the common 
man.  
– Anders Strinberg 
 
The two most salient events in homeland security/emergency 
management in 2007, in my mind, are the acknowledgement of bad 
intelligence collection processes on the threats in Iraq leading up to 
the "War on Terror" and FEMA's fake press conference. The reason 
these events come to mind is the same: trust in government to use 
due diligence to determine what is true and what is not in making 
homeland defense and security decisions, and then its commitment 
to inform the public accordingly. I think the willingness of citizens 
to continue to fund and support homeland security efforts will be 
based on whether or not they trust government is telling them the 
truth about the threat and the decisions made. These two events 
knocked us down on the scale quite a bit.  
– Susan Jones-Hard 
 
For me, the biggest Homeland Security related story has been the 
on-going legal battle for the rights of the detainees in Guantanamo. 
It seems to crystallize the antagonistic relationship between 
human/civil rights versus security. We need to find a balance, 
protecting ourselves while not becoming the next Gestapo nation. 
 – Kate Lamar 
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I think the top story was the Andrew Speaker case (the individual 
with drug resistant TB who went globe trotting). It brought together 
a host of issues, affected many homeland security departments, and 
highlighted the need to integrate public health into the homeland 
security equation. There are so many issues that this case brought 
up – border security, sharing (or lack thereof) of information both 
across departments and agencies within the U.S. as well as with 
international partners, government powers, quarantine, no fly lists, 
timeliness of information, perceived reliability of information 
systems, personal liberties vs. public good, and lack of knowledge of 
fundamental public health issues. It presents excellent 
opportunities for discussion, analysis, and improvement.  
– Anke Richter 
 
From a public health perspective, I think the top homeland security 
story was the Andrew Speaker TB case. The inability of public 
health to appropriately manage that case – or communicate with 
the Department of Homeland Security to control the movement of 
the patient (with him entering through the northern border even 
after being flagged on a watch list) – was particularly disturbing to 
me after working so hard in my former roles to strengthen the 
system. Mistakes were made at all levels of public health – local, 
state, and national – and also within DHS. No one looked good on 
that one. It was fortunate that this was a single case of TB rather 
than pandemic influenza.  
– Senior federal government health leader 
 
THE THREAT 
As 2007 ends, we sit on a precipice. Looking back, a 
bureaucratically mired Department [of Homeland Security] did not 
make direly needed changes to fight an organization without a 
bureaucracy. Looking forward in 2008, Arabs may try to sway the 
presidential election by delivering Osama Bin Laden. This event 
may be the "tipping point" that either dissolves or magnifies the 
epidemic he created. If dissolved, our focus moves to the Peoples 
Republic of China. If magnified, soon after the election that same 
department will respond to the next significant attack.  
– Former senior congressional staff member 
 
I would argue one of the most significant homeland security issues 
was the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released a few months 
ago on “The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland.” With the 
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politically charged discussions on Iraq as the central front in the 
U.S. war on terror, the NIE unequivocally argued that the core 
threat to the U.S. homeland emanates from the tribal areas of 
Pakistan. Even more than this, the U.S. intelligence community 
judged al Qaeda to pose an “undiminished” threat to the homeland 
and to have “regenerated” itself from Pakistan’s tribal areas.  
The language was clear: “Al-Qa’ida is and will remain the most 
serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership 
continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in 
extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to 
supplement its capabilities. We assess the group has protected or 
regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, 
including: a safe haven in the Pakistan Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top 
leadership.”  
– Seth Jones 
 
Without hesitation I looked to foreign affairs for the top homeland 
security issues, because of the implications for domestic homeland 
security and the war on terror. My first thought was that the 
ongoing War in Iraq (with the political instability there 
strengthening al Qaeda), and the circumstances around Musharraf 
declaring a state of emergency in Pakistan, were my top picks. But 
that was before the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Now Pakistan, 
and the strengthening of the Islamic militants and al Qaeda there, is 
my top pick. I think this will have implications for years to come for 
our foreign policy with dire implications for our domestic homeland 
security threat.  
– Senior federal executive 
 
The biggest question for me is who actually is in charge of al Qa’ida 
now and are they reconstituted and able to exert authority globally? 
They are and they have, would be my answer to the last two parts of 
the question. Pakistan and the failure of our foreign policy efforts 
seem to play into this. 
Along with this is the role Iraq will play in the future and 
whether or not we can resist the urge to be idiots with Iran. I am not 
a fan of our diplomatic capability (or full lack there of) and how that 
impacts us negatively with regard to homeland security. 
Another issue for me is the border security issue. Important I 
think because it is a real thing that all the political candidates can 
bat around. Also, because I think that we will eventually face a 
serious threat from internal insurgency from Hispanic 
terrorists/insurgents. Securing that border would go a long way to 
slowing that challenge to sovereignty. 
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Another critical issue is whether this country is going to invest all 
its power in the executive in relation to Homeland Security or if we 
will continue to function as a Constitutional Republic (I personally 
think it will be the former rather than the latter). The 9-11 attacks 
have accelerated Bush and Cheney's desire to make the office of the 
president unconstitutionally powerful in the balance.  
– Homeland Security scholar 
 
It seems to me the growing instability in Southwest Asia (Pakistan 
and Afghanistan) might affect the situation in the United States.  
Can we have homeland security if Pakistan becomes a failed state? 
Can Afghanistan succeed if Pakistan descends into lawlessness? 
What kind of government could follow Musharaf's? Can they be 
trusted with WMD's? If not, what can we do about it? Can we get 
the regional players involved in a constructive way (India, despite 
their poisonous relationship with Pakistan; Iran, despite their 
poisonous relationship with us?)  It makes me worry. 
Other than that, because of the lack of "events" on the home 
front, I think sustainability of homeland security is the main issue 
domestically.  
– Rocco Casagrande 
 
Top Story: "Cold War II" 
As we focus on securing our physical borders, preparing to respond 
to a terrorist event, and pursuing our enemies overseas, we are 
being invaded and slowly consumed by an enemy who is moving 
through our nation's virtual arteries. 
These are the criteria I used for selecting the top HLS related story: 
1. Potential impact to our national sovereignty. 
2. Potential impact to our economic stability. 
3. Frequency/Escalation. 
And here are examples of stories that support my view we are in 
Cold War II: 
“China’s cyber army is preparing to march on America, says 
Pentagon.”8  
“Chinese subcontractor installs Trojan horses on hard drives.”9  
“McAfee CEO David DeWalt says cybercrime has become a $105 
billion business that now surpasses the value of the illegal drug 
trade worldwide.”10 
 ‘Theft of personal data more than triples this year”11 
– Homeland security scholar 
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From my California perspective, the top homeland security issue in 
2007 was the “California Wildfires.” If a boy playing with matches 
started a 38,000-acre fire, then what would happen if intentional 
fires were set all over the state? On a hot, windy day, and with the 
current drought conditions, multiple wildfires would cause massive 
devastation.  
– Sarah Bentley 
 
I have to choose the Southern California Wildfires as being a 
significant homeland security event for 2007. I would choose it for a 
variety of reasons, not the least of which is, I have family and 
friends down there, all of whom were impacted and some directly. 
Other reasons for it being high on the list would have to include: 
a) This has now happened several times within just a few years and 
each time has caused significant economic and emotional damage 
to many families and businesses. The impact was felt not only 
locally but also at the state, federal, and international levels as well. 
b) It caused a lot of emergency management and military to be tied 
up in responding to the fires and related issues, as well as 
disrupting pretty much everything, since people were not able to get 
to work or school. 
c) There was some initial concern that terrorists started some or all 
of the fires. Although it was not the case, it wouldn't take much for 
one to see how easy it would be to plan for the next dry/El Nino 
season to coordinate the setting of a number of fires in strategic 
locations to cause major social and economic disruption.  
– Gretta Marlatt 
 
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
I would say the top homeland security issue of 2007 is specific to 
DHS itself. Recently, the department has adopted a habit of 
"lunging" where it turns all its resources from one crisis to the next.  
The most prevalent example of this was Hurricane Katrina, where 
afterwards, the department became focused solely on hurricanes 
and recovery. As they have inadvertently adopted this doctrine, an 
environment has been created where the guiding agency of the U.S. 
government becomes singly focused on one issue. DHS must find a 
way to manage crises instead of allowing those crises to guide the 
department.  
– Former DHS executive 
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The number one story was the total breakdown of 
federal/state/local collaboration in the process of drafting the 
National Response Framework. The breakdown revealed DHS’ 
broader misunderstanding of the leadership roles that states and 
localities should play in homeland security.  The progress made at 
the end of 2007 in restoring collaboration is much needed, and 
critical to sustaining homeland security capacity over the long haul.  
– Paul Stockton 
 
I am curious, but uneducated, about the interaction between DHS 
and various regulatory agencies such as FERC, DOE, and EPA. Two 
things struck me as odd: (1) The "take over" by DHS of 
petrochemical regulations – regarding the tagging of rail tankers, 
and the ability for DHS to suspend licenses (if it is true), and (2) the 
recently passed Energy Bill. 
What bothers me is that DHS appears to be stepping on toes, 
again, by adding more patches to the patchwork we call regulation. 
I don't know if this is true, but I am speculating that we may be 
headed towards more confusion over who is in charge of what, by 
allowing DHS to regulate industries that already have regulators. 
Somewhat on the flip side, it seems to me that the Congress 
missed a big opportunity to add security to the energy/power sector 
when it passed the Energy bill. But, I didn't hear much about it.   
– Homeland Security scholar 
 
This comes to my mind as the most significant situation in which 
we currently find ourselves: 
 Event: The Congressional Appropriations Acts, PL109-295 and 
PL110-161, that directed organizational change within DHS and 
FEMA, directed operational change with regards to the PFO and 
FCO, directed a grant program to assist with security of not-for-
profit organizations, and increased the funding for Emergency 
Management Performance Grants above administration requests, 
and other provisions. 
Rationale: State and local emergency management professionals 
have campaigned for these and other type changes for years. Recent 
events and poor response performance have caused Congress to 
recognize the validity of the arguments and take a leadership role 
where DHS/FEMA have not taken action nor provided the 
necessary leadership for these improvements.  
  It is a shame that Congress has to become involved in such 
operational matters. Congressional staffers have listened to field 
professionals and now appear more qualified and willing to take 
action than DHS/FEMA senior officers who have not discussed and 
acted in partnership with local and state practitioners of emergency 
management and homeland security. Part of my frustration is that 
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NEMA and IAEM among others have tried, and there have been 
projects, funded by DHS/FEMA, which have also pointed out these 
issues and recommendations that have been slow, at best, in 
coming. We still do not have planning guidance or training courses 
or a National Response Plan worthy of the name even though base 
documents and training courses existed years ago upon which we 
could build updates.  
– Former state director of emergency management 
 
OTHER ISSUES IN 2007 
Just thinking about this brings all kinds of ironic sugarplums to my 
mind. What pops up are: the suspension of habeas corpus, the 
destruction of evidence on interrogations and secret prisons, 
warrant-less spying on U.S. citizens, a potential solution to 
Guantanamo detentions, the conduct of privatized security armies 
in Iraq, and the use of homeland security issues to fuel immigration 
politics. Maybe poison toys and toothpaste from China should also 
be a homeland security issue? Or adolescents with guns shooting up 
their schools? Yet another issue: what will happen to all the 
jihadists who will be released from their sentences around the 
globe? Have they just become even more hardened militants? Has 
there been "rehabilitation" or any mind-changing successes? On the 
home front, here is an interesting turn of events: private security 
firms providing disaster response for rich people.12  
– Terrorism researcher   
 
Here are a couple stories/ issues that I think were/are interesting. I 
also think they will be with us in some capacity in the coming years. 
1. Immigration – The national debate is becoming more political 
and polarizing. 
 2. Homegrown terrorist threat – How are we handling the 
domestic threat? Is there a domestic threat? 
3. The Andrew Speaker TB story. He was the lawyer who 
disregarded authorities and snuck back home with TB. That was a 
real confidence booster in the public health system. Can’t wait for a 
bio outbreak or pan flu epidemic. The CDC lost control of this early 
on and never really regained control. 
4. The fake FEMA press conference – This is a water cooler classic 
at home and abroad. It shows they just don’t get it. Terrific material 
for the Area 51 crowd. 
5. Guantanamo – Mind boggling. How long is this going to go on? 
6. Fusion Centers – Who is watching the collectors? 
 – Homeland security researcher 
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I think the top story and perhaps issue for 2007 was related to our 
borders with Mexico and with Canada. It seemed that Congress and 
the administration were continuously battling over the best way to 
approach the issue. State government officials were also engaged in 
the dialogue, whether or not they were a border state due to the 
immigration policy implications which has an affect on the 
economic stability of many states. 
In addition, some of the presidential candidates have been using 
this issue as a part of their campaign platform. This puts the issue 
in front of us on an almost daily basis. 
– Former state homeland security adviser 
 
From my perspective the most significant issues for homeland 
security is the collapse of our southern border and subsequent 
uncontrolled immigration. In addition to adding an element of 
insecurity, the obfuscation of our immigration laws, pertinent 
police powers, and a growing "gray" economy do more to erode our 
social, economic, health, and educational security than perhaps any 
collection of terrorist threats facing this nation. In some circles, the 
lack of border security means there is no homeland security.   
– Homeland Security scholar 
 
Andrew Speaker TB incident – The event demonstrated strengths 
and weaknesses in prevention and response capabilities.  
Information sharing systems helped to connect the dots,13 yet the 
success or failure of a system is ultimately dependent on human 
factors. In this case, the human factors of the border security officer 
came into play.14 
Holy Land Foundation Trial – The event demonstrated the 
challenges of fighting terrorism in the American court system.15  
The lack of multi-disciplinary/academic research in homeland 
security. Much of the homeland security budget has been directed 
towards developing equipment in the private sector and procuring 
it. Priorities are focused on projects that are immediately 
applicable. Many homeland security issues, however, are complex 
and change over time – which may require strategic approaches 
from multiple disciplines.16  
Protection of personal data was the theme in several stories in 2007 
– from databases being stolen from laptops in cars to England’s 
concern about the use of personal information in flight screening.17  
As our technology advances in the information age, our policies and 
practices need to keep pace.  
– Lauren Fernandez 
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The top stories for me are about collaboration and leadership.  
Where have we gotten in the past year?  
The San Diego Fire Storm: What happened to unified command? 
What can we learn from that experience? 
Jay M. Cohen’s leadership: The Department of Homeland Security’s 
under secretary for science and technology has stepped outside 
bureaucracy to find out what really going on in the science and 
technology domain. Has publishing information about gaps and 
accepting solutions from the ‘street’ made a difference? 
DHS Grants moving back to FEMA: Is this a regional solution or 
just more confusion for state and locals. 
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) and other portals for 
communicating best practices: Why is it still so hard to share? 
 – Former DHS staff member. 
 
ONE MORE LOOK 
 
A tag cloud is a box displaying a set of words.  The size of each word is 
proportional to the frequency with which it appears in a relevant set; the bigger 
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the word, the more often it appears.  The tag cloud here shows the top 100 terms 
used in this article.18 The cloud depicts the semantic field that emerges from the 
ideas discussed above.  It is one portrait of homeland security in the year 2007. 
 
Christopher Bellavita teaches in the masters degree program at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.  He can be reached at  
christopherbellavita@gmail.com. 
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Another Question Concerning Technology: 
The Ethical Implications of Homeland Defence and 
Security Technologies 
 




This essay begins to provide a unified moral reckoning with the way in which 
ideas concerning technological progress have altered the rules of military 
engagement and the implementation of homeland security. It will address 
both military technologies and technologies that secure the homeland, since 
the development and use of these technologies are vulnerable to the same 
ethical pitfalls. First, this essay employs Just War theory as a theoretical frame 
in which to situate the discussion and argues that the technology associated 
with precision guided munitions (PGM) only open the possibility of ethical 
discrimination and proportionality, but in no way insure that these 
possibilities will be actualized. Second, it begins to expose the relationship 
between the increasing popularity of PGM technology and the rhetoric that is 
used to describe contemporary military conflict. If precision weaponry is 
assumed to be inherently ethical, it may grant policymakers and strategists the 
chance to conflate the description of tactics with the prescription of normative 
judgements. Several case studies are employed to demonstrate this point. The 
second half of the paper asks if the technological progress that has come to 
define homeland security may lead to similar ethical difficulties in the fields of 
intelligence and law enforcement. It explores the way in which military 
technology and rhetoric might be redeployed in the domestic sphere.   
The questions concerning PGM and homeland security technologies and 
their moral implications are also “questions concerning technology” – an 
interrogation of the moral and epistemic assumptions that seem to accompany 
and validate technical capabilities. It is a question that strikes at the heart of 
homeland security. When Martin Heidegger delivered “The Question 
Concerning Technology” to a Bavarian audience in 1955, he spoke at a pivotal 
historical moment in which technological advancements were beginning to be 
confused with political imperatives and the moral justifications of war. Today, 
we face a similar moment.  The arms race of the Cold War may be over, but 
the danger that a blind faith in technological know-how poses to moral and 
rational sensibilities has never been as clear and present. In the end, this essay 
will suggest that technology itself neither answers nor ignores ethical 
questions; it is only the particular use of these technologies by practitioners 
that will either distract us from, or make us well attuned to, particular ethical 
questions concerning the rights and safety of the U.S. citizenry.        
A JUST WAR ON TERROR?  
The robust literature surrounding the issue of “just war” provides a helpful 
point of departure for a discussion of military technologies and their moral 
implications in homeland defence. This discussion will be employed later to 
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frame the discussion of homeland security. A brief review of Just War Theory 
may help to orient readers. Just War theory is usually addressed by way of two 
related constructs: jus ad bellum (justice in going to war) and jus in bello 
(justice at/in war).  
Having a just cause is the first step in deciding to wage a just war. Any act 
of aggression is regarded as an unjust act and warrants a military response. In 
this context, a just cause is one that may be regarded as an act of immediate 
self-defence. Due to the narrowness of this definition, it is often broadened to 
take into account pre-emptive actions that are aimed to avoid future 
aggressive actions by another party. This expansion of self-defence to include 
pre-emptive military action will prove to be a slippery topic in our later 
discussion of “national security” and will be important in the designation of 
potential threats by homeland security officials. The second mandate of jus ad 
bellum states that a just war ought to be waged only when there is a 
reasonable chance of achieving the objectives of the mission. These issues are 
negotiated in the coming section, which asks if there is a relationship between 
technical capabilities that might ostensibly achieve objectives (capabilities 
that have been dramatically improved in the past decade) and the ability to 
designate potential threats to national security (an ability of judgement that 
remains difficult to hone). We must ask whether an increase in technical 
abilities might encourage a more liberal, and perhaps inaccurate, assessment 
of “threat” and national security. Before elaborating on this point, however, a 
bit needs to be said in regard to jus in bello.   
Most scholars agree on at least two defining values associated with jus in 
bello: proportionality of means and precise discrimination. Proportionality 
generally refers to the degree to which military success is maximized through 
the use of minimal force. It is, at once, the demand to avoid unnecessary 
damage in any military strike. The definition of “just discrimination” is equally 
vague. Indeed, it flirts with a type of tautology, as seen in Dwight Roblyer’s 
description: “discrimination means the separation of individuals into two 
categories: those liable to be justly attacked and those who should be immune 
to attack.”1 More generally, discrimination refers to the separation between 
the military and the civilian, between targets and non-targets.2 The intent here 
is not to examine this distinction, but rather to notice the ways in which the 
advent of PGM seems to mask the ethical judgement that lies at the heart of 
this distinction. A similar examination will be conducted in reference to the 
“targeting” and monitoring of particular suspects who might threaten 
domestic security. First, let us take a careful look at the development of PGM 
in recent military engagement.   
It might seem that the capabilities of PGM answer the two imperatives of 
Just War quite adequately. During Operation Enduring Freedom (7 October, 
2001) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (19 March, 2003), the public saw an 
increasing number of photographs and film clips that seemed to reflect greater 
attention to these two Just War dicta. As of April, 2003, 80 percent of all 
bombs or missiles deployed by the U.S. Air Force in Operation Iraqi Freedom 
were guided by video camera, laser, or satellite targeting. In contrast, only 10 
percent of all munitions employed in Operation Dessert Storm were so-called 
precision guided munitions.3 Today, enemy targets appear to be targeted in 
highly populated areas with minimal collateral casualties; “smart bombs” 
enter windows and airshafts, seemingly detonating only where necessary. At 
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first glance, the “proof” of the munitions’ effectiveness and surgical precision 
seems to respond to the call for military discrimination and proportionality.   
First glances, however, can be deceptive. Precision guided munitions and 
remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) technology only opens the possibility of 
discrimination and military proportionality. Despite their “smartness,” bombs 
cannot discriminate. Ultimately, the distinctions between enemy and 
innocent, and the choices of military cost-benefit analysis, fall to the human 
beings that drive the “targeting cycle” of a given military campaign.4 This will 
be equally true in the case of homeland security officials in their attempt to 
identify suspects and conduct counterterrorism operations in the United 
States. This fact risks being obscured by the rhetoric of “progress” that 
surrounds advancement in military strike capabilities and in pinpoint 
surveillance technologies. As Michael Foley has noted, the “concept of 
progress has always suffered from a variety of logical and analytic problems 
which make it susceptible to ambiguity, disillusionment and abuse.”5 The 
relation between rhetorical ambiguity and technological progress will be 
brought out in the coming section, but a bit more needs to be said in relation 
to Foley’s observation.  The “abuse” that Foley cites arises when advancement 
in technology or know-how is not accompanied by corresponding efforts in 
ethics and political philosophy that might guide this advancement. In 
describing this abuse, Foley continues, “Progress in knowledge therefore 
resulted in proportionately less guidance over the direction to take it or which 
uses it should be served by it.”6  This tendency is reflected when progress in 
one venue, objective standards of casualty rate and destruction, are confused 
with normative standards of ethical justification.       
In light of this situation, the decisions for military planners and homeland 
security officials have become more difficult and more morally charged.  First, 
they must recognize the “abuse” hitherto described. Second, they must combat 
this abuse by redoubling their efforts to guide technical progress – instead of 
risking that technical progress might be allowed to guide moral sentiment. 
Finally, and to this end, they must recognize that the question is no longer one 
of sheer strike or surveillance capability, but rather one of dubious legitimacy. 
Granted, PGM helps avoid the catastrophic collateral damage that policy-
makers faced during conventional or nuclear weapons escalation during the 
Cold War.  However, as Dulles and Eisenhower pointed out in the early 1950s, 
the risk of Clausewitzian total war brought with it the practical constraints of 
self-preservation, often eliminating the role of moral choice in military 
planning.7 Very simply, there is no real moral quandary when confronted with 
the choice between cold peace and thermonuclear conflagration. On the other 
hand, the quandary emerges with unprecedented force when the stakes of a 
particular case of military targeting are considerably lower and are often 
leveraged against individuals and groups that do not share the same sense of 
self-preservation. Similarly, contemporary forms of surveillance and 
counterterrorism, employed in domestic security measures, are now, with the 
help of modern technology, becoming so subtle and unobtrusive that they can 
easily be used without the knowledge of a given population. Indeed, these 
technologies are effective only to the extent that they remain undetected by a 
given community. To put this point another way, in the past, one did not have 
to agonize over the ethical implications of homeland security technologies for 
one of two reasons – either these technologies did not exist or, if they existed, 
they could not be employed nearly as subtly as they are today. When the 
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abuses of security technologies were more obvious, more transparent to the 
public, the choice to use or not to use them was more clear-cut for law 
enforcement agents. Now that digital and biometric devices have come to 
supplement our surveillance repertoire, the technologies do exist and can be 
used without a public’s knowledge.  This is the point where ethical debate 
concerning these issues ought to take root.   
THE “PROGRESS” OF PGM AND SURVEILLANCE  
Ironically, wars often become a viable, although questionably ethical, option 
when nation-states amass low-yield, precision-guided weaponry. A recent 
report issued by the Institute for International Strategic Studies suggests that 
PGM technology may lower the threshold that currently limits a state’s 
military action.8  In this case, military action may become the primary option, 
rather than the last resort, of foreign policy.  This case seems to have emerged 
in recent U.S. actions in the Middle East and elsewhere. It seems not only 
possible, but also probable, that faith in the military modernization process 
allowed policy makers the chance to downplay alternative forms of soft power 
that might have been used in affecting change in particular territories.  Soft 
power, as defined by Joseph Nye, is “co-optive” power – the ability to alter 
another’s purposes by non-coercive means;9 as E.H. Carr notes in The Twenty 
Years’ Crisis, it is the “power over opinion.”10 The tendency to downplay this 
form of co-optive power in favor of the impressive coercive force of PGM is 
illustrated in the case of former Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, a 
staunch advocate of the use of PGM, who is quoted by Nye as admitting that 
he didn’t know what the term “soft power” meant.11 Similarly, we might ask if 
the alternatives to technologically advanced, and subtly invasive, homeland 
security measures that jeopardize civil rights will be overlooked if policy 
makers become mesmerized by the capabilities of technology.   
Turning to the issue of homeland defence, if we use the metric of 
unintended destructive force in order to evaluate the effectiveness and ethical 
standing of military strikes, it seems that PGM fits the bill quite nicely.  
However, while besieged populations may not be directly effected by the blast 
of a surgical air strike, the social, economic and humanitarian aftershocks of 
frequent PGM strikes may have lasting effects on the people of a surrounding 
area and the psychological landscape of the besieged population. As several 
commentators have highlighted, the societal upheaval following a military 
attack can take a real and deadly toll.12 This is especially important if the 
intent of PGM use is to win military conflict, but also not to loose the “hearts 
and minds” of a given population.   
Many policymakers claim that the risks of adjusting and lowering military 
thresholds are outweighed by the advantages of employing PGM in 
asymmetric conflicts in which particular objects and – more poignantly – 
particular individuals are liquidated with minimum “innocent losses.” As the 
most recent conflict in Iraq has shown, such losses are still taken, albeit on a 
smaller scale. Human error still occurs.  In the case of both homeland defence 
and homeland security, the ethical question of their implementation turns on 
the matter of human error. This point, however, is occasionally lost in the on-
going attempt to increase technical capabilities. These capabilities are 
confused with ethical justification. For example, precision-guided munitions 
expanded the repertoire of strategic planners, including practices that were 
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hitherto excluded from the realm of Just War. Pre-emptive strike and the 
elimination of individuals with questionable military standing are becoming 
tools of standard U.S. military procedure. When Hellfire missiles can be 
launched from “standoff positions,” targeting the cars of enemy military 
leaders, the art of war may quickly become the art of political assassination or 
summary execution.13 It is true that these martial tools have a long history, but 
never have military planers and policymakers had to pay so very little to 
employ them. Precision guided munitions are used, at least in part, to avoid 
the loss of clandestine military ground forces and seem to answer the question 
of collateral damage. Both of these points may provide strategists and 
politicians carte blanche to target “potentially dangerous” individuals, to 
practice a form of selective targeting of questionable legality. This possibility 
needs to be confronted head on by policy makers and academics. The 
aforementioned practice  is illegal under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the UN Principles on Effective Prevention and 
Investigation of the Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, and 
Article 147 of the 4th Geneva Convention. We must weigh security against 
legal standing without allowing the story of technological progress to 
dominate the discussion of ethical norms.   
John Yoo, who supports the successful targeting of the Hussein brothers in 
downtown Mosul, objects to this point, arguing that such surgical strike 
attacks should not be confused with illegitimate assassination:  
As Hugo Grotius, the father of international law, observed in 1646, ‘It 
is permissible to kill an enemy.’ Legitimate military targets include not 
just foot soldiers, but the command and control structure of an 
enemy's military, leading up to its commander in chief.14 
Grotius may be right. It may be permissible to kill an “enemy.” For Grotius, 
however, the question of specificity in military targeting could be answered 
rather easily.  In On the Law of War and Peace, he adopts Livy’s position, that 
“war is declared against the sovereign, and all within his jurisdiction."15 This 
sovereign-centered approach to targeting, however, seems unhelpful and 
unrealistic as non-state actors emerge as the primary threat to international 
security.16 Yoo surely recognizes this fact, yet fails to address a question that 
arises from these shifting security circumstances: In the age of asymmetric 
warfare and precision guided weaponry, who exactly is the “enemy?”  
Ironically, but not coincidently, the definition of “enemy” has become 
increasingly vague as the weaponry to deal with this ambiguous foe has 
become increasingly precise.  This correlation is in no way arbitrary and is 
fraught with moral concerns.   
Unfortunately, legal precedent is not extremely helpful in resolving the 
aforementioned situation. The rules of Hague Convention IV (1907) deal with 
counterinsurgency and revolutionary conflicts only in setting forth the 
conditions of belligerent status in Article 1. As William O’Brien notes, 
“Historically, the Hague Conventions were concerned with interstate, and the 
problems of unconventional war, even as a part of international conventional 
conflict, were not seriously addressed.”17 In light of the issues surrounding the 
use of unconventional force in World War II and Vietnam, it is surprising and 
disturbing that the Geneva Convention of 1949 and Geneva Protocol II of 1977 
do not do a much better job of addressing the situation.   
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In his analysis of jus in bello in asymmetric engagement, David Rodin 
suggests that the increasing vagueness in military targeting is precisely the 
trend that must be counteracted if the principles of Just War are to be upheld.  
In so doing, he begins to revise the legal understanding of unconventional 
conflict and Just War Theory. He notes that as asymmetries arise, stronger 
military powers must assume a greater burden of proof in validating targeting 
techniques. For example,  
Western powers have historically considered dual use facilities to be 
legitimate military targets, but a more stringent interpretation of jus in 
bello (one that could be applied in the case of asymmetric conflict) 
would place all ambiguous targets and dual-use facilities that have 
important civilian functions off-limits for attack.18  
Instead of emphasizing the stringency of Just War norms, an uncritical faith 
in precision technology, in its ability to discriminate, in its concern for the 
innocent, has occasionally allowed strategists and policymakers to employ 
vague rhetoric and fuzzy categories in defining enemy positions. A brief case 
study illuminates this point.        
TECHNOLOGICAL KNOW-HOW AND THE AMBIGUOUS 
RHETORIC OF CONFLICT 
Before the attacks of September 11, 2001, before the subsequent U.S. War on 
Terror, Gordon Graham made a prescient observation on the nature of enemy 
designation and targeting: “‘Terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ are not descriptive 
words.  They do not pick one sort of thing about which we might ask whether 
it is good or bad, but in themselves, serve to condemn whatever causes and 
methods the user of these words disapproves of.”19 This goes for the 
description of both international and domestic “terrorism.” Today, these 
ambiguous, but powerful, watchwords dominate the discourse of U.S. 
international policy and have percolated into military targeting – targeting 
that is increasingly executed by PGM. Similarly, these words dominate the 
surveillance targeting of homeland security programs. This section will 
address the relation between the ambiguity of targeting language and the 
specificity of targeting execution. The literature on the rhetorical strategies 
President George W. Bush, Vice-President Cheney, and former Secretary 
Rumsfeld is well documented and underscores the possible moral 
shortcomings of these strategies.20 Many of these accounts, however, overlook 
the way in which the development of highly specific weaponry and 
surveillance technologies have allowed – and indeed encouraged – the current 
administration to maintain its position in the War on Terror. This refers to the 
war at home and the war abroad. The use of this technology will not be unique 
to this administration and will continue to affect the deployment of particular 
rhetorical strategies.    
The vital connection between the deployment of a technologically advanced 
military and the deployment of a general and ideologically-charged rhetoric 
became explicit in the fall of 2001. In the following statement, President Bush 
moves seamlessly from addressing military capacities to broad moral 
justification for implementing them:   
I have faith in our military.  And we have got a job to do – just like the 
farmers and ranchers and business owners and factory workers have a 
job to do.  My administration has a job to do, and we're going to do 
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it.  We will rid the world of the evil-doers.  We will call together 
freedom loving people to fight terrorism…we've never seen this kind of 
evil before. But the evildoers have never seen the American people in 
action before, either - and they're about to find out.21 
The slippage between capabilities and moral justification is enabled by the 
misguided belief that precise military action is inherently ethical. Is it 
appropriate for a “faith” in military-based surgical strike capabilities to grant 
policy makers confidence in their moral prerogative to “rid the world of evil-
doers?”     
Rumsfeld, a long-time proponent of PGM and RPV technology has also, not 
coincidently, been quick to provide broad-stroke, ethical justification for 
military strikes. At a 2003 press conference, the former secretary of defence 
stated:    
Our military capabilities are so devastating and precise that we can 
destroy an Iraqi tank under a bridge without damaging the bridge. We 
do not need to kill thousands of innocent Iraqis to remove Saddam 
Hussein from power. At least that's our belief. We believe we can 
destroy his institutions of power and oppression in an orderly 
manner.22 
Rumsfeld opens with an assessment of technical military superiority that rests 
on the advancement of precision munitions. From these premises, however, 
he concludes that this superiority can be transferred to the moral realm, that 
technical precision can accurately “target” the meaning of “innocence,” 
“oppression” and “order.” This conflation between analytic description of 
capabilities and moral prescription is dangerous in its subtlety and stands as 
an ethical dilemma born from the development of PGM and other security 
technologies. For Rumsfeld, the “can” of security competencies implies an 
“ought” that is rarely examined in terms of stringent ethical guidelines. Rodin 
suggests that the tables ought to be turned when considering a nation’s 
response to asymmetric threats: 
Pentagon and UK Ministry of Defence spokespeople never tire of 
telling us of the laser guided precision munitions and astonishing 
intelligence gathering capabilities at their disposal. Because Western 
powers have capabilities not possessed by weaker groups that enable 
them to achieve military ends with lower levels of collateral damage, it 
does not seem unreasonable to require them to do so.23   
While I believe that Rodin’s point is overstated and somewhat unrealistic, his 
general thrust – that U.S. policymakers and strategists must shoulder even 
greater responsibility in the targeting process – seems right. Instead of 
inspiring over-confidence, the revolution of military affairs (RMA) should give 
us ethical pause.    
To this point, the discussion has focused on the moral difficulties that are 
raised in the refinement and the employment of PGM technologies. These 
difficulties are bound to be exploited by those individuals and groups who do 
seek to attack a highly mechanized military such as that of the United States.  
As a result, PGM targeting will only become more problematic. In light of this 
possibility, it seems wise to provide morally sound alternatives to the current 
coupling of fuzzy categories and precise surgical strike capabilities, 
alternatives that would allow strategists to avoid overstepping the bounds of 
international law. Steps are being made in this direction.   
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In Operation Enduring Freedom, the Department of Defence demanded 
that legal advisors be present at every stage of the targeting cycle to insure 
that commanders and strategists adhered to international law. U.S. Air Force 
legal reports indicate that military planners were, on the whole, “overly 
cautious” when faced with the responsibility of initiating strikes, a 
responsibility made more acute by the use of PGM. These reports also indicate 
that such hesitancy may, in fact, prolong human suffering by extending the 
duration of military operations.24 This assessment, however, stands against 
most evaluations of PGM targeting. While the presence of legal advisors in the 
targeting process is sure to alleviate some of the moral concerns surrounding 
PGM, it may provide policy-makers a false sense of ethical legitimacy.    
THE MORAL SHOCKWAVE OF TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES 
It is worth noting that all military targeting, and particularly PGM targeting, 
begins with precise intelligence gathering and the methods employed therein.  
Legal expertise must be brought to bear on these methods as well and should 
dovetail with a study of precision guided munitions. “Painting” and destroying 
specific enemy targets with laser-guided precision often depends on the 
reliability of intelligence garnered from the interrogation and coercion of 
enemy prisoners. The demands of PGM targeting, the need to specify an 
enemy’s exact position and character, may place undue burden on 
interrogators who feel responsible for providing this information.   
This is not to suggest that PGM technology is a direct cause of 
informant/prisoner abuse; it surely is not.  It is possible, however, that the 
effort to implement effective PGM strikes may indirectly encourage moral 
crises in other areas of the armed forces. If we give priority to the accurate 
targeting of enemy combatants, which seems like a reasonable priority, we 
may have to go to extreme measures to glean proper intelligence.  The pursuit 
of one moral outcome (discrimination in the targeting cycle) may force us to 
give up others (proper interrogation procedures and not detaining suspects 
without legal mandate). This is not to set up unrealistic or impossible 
standards for the homeland security or homeland defense official, it is only to 
underscore the relatedness of various ethical issues. This is the moral 
“shockwave” of the revolution of military affairs and the ever-advancing forms 
of security technology.   
A final shockwave of security and defence technologies needs to be 
addressed, for it will only continue to reverberate as technological know-how 
drives the trends of the revolution in military affairs and homeland security.  
Commentators often discuss the way in which surgical strike technology helps 
strategists avoid civilian collateral damage. Similarly, pinpoint domestic 
intelligence is lauded for avoiding the “blanket approach” to surveillance that 
might eviscerate the civil rights of an entire population. Additionally, the use 
of PGM and RPV arguably reduces the risks to military personnel in many 
engagements. Similarly, anti-terrorist technologies employed in the 
“homeland” are meant to protect security agents in the field. It is fair to 
celebrate both of these points – and celebrate them earnestly.  This being said, 
it seems wise to address the way in which limiting troop losses might affect the 
duration and execution of wars. Similarly, it seems wise to address the way in 
which protecting field agents might affect the objectives and duration of a 
domestic security program. Would a prolonged War on Terror be possible 
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without the technological know-how of the 21st century? How does 
technological capability, rather than sustained and democratic discourse, 
determine the shape and duration of this war? While a detailed study is 
beyond the scope of this essay, a few questions are warranted.  First, what is 
the relation between troop losses and public support of a particular conflict?  
Do constant, yet low-frequency, losses – the kind of losses that are suffered in 
guerrilla warfare in which PGM are currently used – insulate strategists and 
policymakers from a democratic outcry that might affect the course of a 
conflict? To what extent is this development beneficial? While surgical strike 
capabilities allow military and security planners to do their jobs effectively, is 
there a type of technological-institutional inertia that may encourage an 
uncritical acceptance of current tactics? Finally, what are the fiscal and 
budgetary considerations of PGM and surveillance technologies? Will 
technological progress in security programs, developed to protect liberal 
ideals, outstrip a nation’s ability to provide liberal institutions to its citizens?    
In all of these questions, it is necessary to remember that it is not the 
advancement of technology that is question begging, but rather the purposeful 
use of this technology by moral agents that must be re-interrogated.    
In 1947, at the dawning of the nuclear age, President Truman set forth a 
goal that remains elusive:   
We must catch up morally and internationally with the machine age. 
We must catch up with it, and we must catch up with it in such a way 
as to create peace in the world, or it will destroy us and everybody else. 
And that we don't dare to contemplate.25    
In 2004, at the dawning of another military era, the “machine age” continues 
to outstrip our moral practices and ethical sensitivities. While the use of 
precision-guided munitions seems to satisfy the longstanding mandates of 
Just War, in fact, it only complicates the moral standing of armed conflict. In 
short, precision-guided munitions create as many ethical dilemmas as they 
solve. Policy-makers and military strategists may forgo the target of morality 
at an ironic moment, at a moment when precision weaponry seems to grant 
them the clearest shot.    
HOMELAND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES: WHEN “NEW” MIGHT 
NOT ALWAYS BE BETTER 
How does the discussion of the ethical ramifications of PGM bear on the issue 
of homeland security? This question seems important to the extent that the 
technologies employed abroad in the War on Terror have also defined the 
rhetoric and practice of domestic security. As the National Research Council 
noted in a 2003 report on homeland security technologies, “The science and 
technology required by the Army for Homeland Security need not be unique. 
The science and technology work already being done for the Objective Force 
(HD) could provide much of the technology needed for Homeland Security”26 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to note that this discussion addresses 
homeland security only in its capacity to implement counter-terrorism 
measures. In short, it assumes the “strict constructionist” perspective that 
Christopher Bellavita describes as a position that echoes the traditional 
understanding of homeland security in the National Strategy.27       
That being said, this analysis of homeland security technologies will 
address three interrelated issues and may provide a helpful model for future 
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investigation. First it will briefly address establishment of a specialized branch 
of DHS that focuses on technology research and development. A comment on 
the growth of this branch, coupled with several observations concerning the 
2001 U.S. Patriot Act, will provide the rationale for examining both the 
technological advancements in the Revolution in Military Affairs and 
homeland security. Second, the discussion will examine the SAFETY Act of 
2002 that was established to encourage research and development in “anti-
terrorist technologies.” Third, it will evaluate the potential synergy between 
surveillance and biometric technologies in the project of homeland security. 
All of these evaluations resonate closely with the earlier discussion of PGM to 
the extent that impressive technological capabilities may continue to be 
conflated with our ability to make normative judgements concerning 
innocence, guilt, and threat.   
So where does the technology of homeland security come from? Many 
people would have trouble answering this question – perhaps even a few 
people who work in the bureaucratic monster of DHS. The answer to this 
question is complicated, but a good place to start is the Science and 
Technology Directorate of DHS. The directorate is lauded as one of the great 
success stories of the War on Terror.  It is also a story that is often not told to 
the public and the details of which are often omitted. The anonymity of the 
directorate’s scientists and the secrecy of its projects are necessary safeguards 
in order to maintain the effectiveness of security technology employment, but 
have the unintended consequences of fuelling Orwellian suspicions 
concerning technology and precluding open discussion concerning the ethical 
implications of the use of these technologies. The directorate was established 
in the winter of 2003 and was modelled loosely after the Pentagon’s Defence 
Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) and the technology directorate 
at the CIA. Many members of the DHS directorate were trained in one of these 
two organizations. DARPA serves as the technological dynamo of the armed 
forces, providing soldiers in the field with the latest military tools. The 
technology directorate of the CIA is responsible for supporting field officers 
and intelligence analysts with technologically advanced means of 
counterterrorism and intelligence gathering. Here, it begins to make more 
sense why a discussion of the ethics of war might serve as an appropriate 
preface to the ethics of domestic security technology. The ethical blind spots in 
one arena of strategy may be imported into DHS policies. There are also 
powerful resonances between the rhetoric of war and the rhetoric of 
protecting the homeland by way of technological innovation that might give us 
pause.   
In 2001, John Ashcroft described the two inter-related principles of the 
PATRIOT Act, stating that the first was “the airtight surveillance of terrorists” 
and the second was to increase the speed in “tracking down and intercepting 
terrorists.” After employing the loose term of “terrorists” to identify threats to 
national security, Ashcroft gets to the very particular means of achieving this 
goal. His comment bears directly on the discussion of the ethical risks implicit 
in employing security technologies.   
Law enforcement officials will begin to employ new tools that will ease 
administrative burdens and delays in apprehending terrorists…Agents 
will be directed to take advantage of new, technologically neutral 
standards for intelligence gathering. 28  
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Several points deserve to be underscored in this passage. First, it seems 
reasonable to expect that many of the “new tools” to which Ashcroft refers 
have their roots in techne, in the instruments (both physical and legal) that 
law enforcement officials can employ. “New” is not necessarily better, or more 
ethical. A long and sincere discussion is warranted in order to address the 
relationship between these new tools, oftentimes defined by their impressive 
technical capabilities, and the “administrative burdens” that Ashcroft sought 
to avoid. The term “administration” refers to a thoughtful human process that 
is shot through with normative claims and assumptions. Administration refers 
to a process of human judgment that is burdened with responsibility.  
Administration can never be substituted or “unburdened” by the mere use of 
new tools. Tools should be used, but must be used in the right way.   
Second, it ought to be noted that the delay in apprehending criminals, a 
delay that Ashcroft wanted to avoid, has never simply been a matter of raw 
capability. It is equally a matter of judgement and due process. This fact needs 
to be considered carefully; as capabilities increase, it cannot be the case that 
due process and responsibility are abandoned in pursuing the siren calls of 
technological progress and security.   
The appeal of technology need not be siren call – but it often is. This danger 
lurks in the background as Ashcroft reflects on his belief in “new, 
technologically neutral standards” of security implementation. The belief in 
the neutrality and objectivity of technology leads us away from meaningful 
discussions and debates concerning the ethicality of technology’s use. It 
encourages us to forget that progress in the technical realm does not 
necessarily translate into the advancement of ethics or justice. The use of 
technology is never neutral. The creation of technology is never neutral. The 
ends of technology are never neutral. They are always part and parcel of the 
interests of individuals and groups that should be discussed, and in many 
cases, hotly debated. Additionally, Ashcroft’s elision of “neutral standards” 
and technology seems more at home in the Scottish Enlightenment of the 
1700s than in the political mindset of the United States in the 21st century.  
Standards are, almost by definition, not neutral. A standard is always a 
standard in reference to some point of view or to some agreed upon 
benchmark. This situation is question begging: If one forgets that standards 
are human measurements rather than unalterable technological products, 
does this effectively overlook the debate that might alter and revise these 
standards?  This question emerges in the rhetoric of homeland security, but 
also in the legislation surrounding the development of new security 
technologies.   
The Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies (SAFETY) 
Act of 2002 provides legal liability protection to the providers of qualified 
anti-terrorist technology. In his Congressional testimony in 2006, Jay Cohen 
describes SAFETY:  
These (liability) protections apply to companies when the worst 
happens – an act of terrorism. The SAFETY Act is intended to ensure 
that the threat of liability does not deter potential sellers or 
manufactures of anti-terrorism technologies from creating or 
providing products and services that could save lives.29  
It is worth noting that Cohen’s testimony was given four years after the 
SAFETY Act was accepted by DHS.  Indeed, SAFETY did not receive a hearing 
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in either chamber of the legislature and was inserted into the Homeland 
Security Bill late in the legislative process when it was observed that the 
indemnification processes considered earlier would not suffice. The 
implementation of SAFETY is of concern for at least three reasons that 
coincide with the earlier discussion of PGM technologies.  
First, the “anti-terrorist technologies” under the SAFETY act include 
information security systems, biometric devices, surveillance networks and 
perimeter intrusion detection devices. Biometric technologies potentially link 
the legal identities of visitors and U.S. citizens with their physical 
characteristics. The technical specificity and cost effectiveness of these 
products have dramatically increased in recent years. For example, 
surveillance technologies have become more efficient through the use of GPS 
and have become smaller, and hence more easily concealed. While this fact 
makes them more “effective,” they potentially jeopardize some of the civil 
liberties that U.S. citizens have long enjoyed under the Fourth Amendment.  
These “products” also include the services that may support anti-terrorist 
technologies, services that might not be regulated by pre-existing guidelines.  
Second, the technical specificity of these products has come hand-in-hand 
with an ambiguity in the language that is used to explain and justify these 
technologies. The SAFETY Act itself reflects this ambiguity in the sense that it 
is unclear whether the act provides “safety” to U.S. citizens or to sellers and 
vendors of anti-terrorist technologies who wish to be shielded from liability 
litigation. Cohen suggests that this act is necessary since it “saves lives,” but he 
avoids addressing the costs of SAFETY on the lives and liberties of visitors and 
citizens. These costs might begin to be highlighted in a discussion of the way 
in which SAFETY could transform the common law doctrine of “government 
contractor defence” which hitherto limited the liability of sellers of contracted 
technologies to the U.S. government. Under this law, the government issued 
the specifications for the product and the manufacturer met these 
specifications with full disclosure.  SAFETY, as written in 2002, begins to do 
away with this procedure. Under SAFETY, companies submit the 
specifications of their products and, if approved, earn a rebuttable 
presumption in future liability cases that can be overcome only by proof that 
the company acted fraudulently in the submission of these specifications.  One 
might ask, in this case, who exactly is liable if the employment of “anti-
terrorist” technologies does result in harm to the lives and liberties of U.S. 
citizens?  
It appears that DHS might be willing to limit citizens’ ability to present 
grievances in an attempt to curtail excessive tort litigation in the instance of 
anti-terrorist technologies. Recent developments in the SAFETY Final Rule 
(2006) indicate that it might also be willing to accelerate the testing and 
regulation cycles of these technologies.30 When considered in tandem, these 
two comments ought to give us pause – if not a cause for genuine alarm.  Is 
the loosening of tort litigation and the accelerating of product testing a viable 
long-term solution for the maintenance of homeland security? 
To this point, this essay has not addressed specific technologies, but only 
discussed the ways of thinking and talking about their use. It has addressed 
the ethical blind spots that might characterize the use of security technologies 
without describing any specific homeland security measures. Two such 
measures will be addressed in conclusion: thermal resonance imagining and 
the Internet surveillance programs, Carnivore and Magic Lantern.31   
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The U.S. military, in night reconnaissance, targeting, and combat in 
obscure conditions, has used thermal imaging for many decades. This 
technology allows soldiers in the field to literally see through walls by 
detecting the thermal resonance of potential enemy combatants. Similar 
technologies are used in missile guidance systems that employ heat-seeking 
devices. This technology is beginning to “come home” in new ways, to be 
redeployed on the domestic front in the War on Terror. Implementation is in 
its early stages, but the implications of this technology should be confronted 
now. Thermal imaging can allow field officers to see a suspect hiding in the 
dark; it has recently been suggested that the same imaging can allow officers 
to see inside a suspect’s head.32   
When a person is upset, anxious or aroused, blood rushes to the face and 
particularly the eyes.  This physiological effect can be detected on a thermal 
image. The eyes “light up” on the image. This technology has been developed 
in interrogation scenarios and now supports the most innovative lie-detection 
devices. Thermal imaging technology, however, is beginning to make its way 
out of the interrogation room and into U.S. customs, at the major points of 
entry to the United States. It is used to screen individuals who might attempt 
to enter the country with false documentation, assuming that these 
individuals will be more agitated than their fellow passengers. This practice 
may prove ethically problematic in the coming years. After our discussion of 
precision guided munitions, it goes almost without saying that in the case of 
detecting physiological effects, thermal resonance imaging can neither help 
officials judge the motives of a person nor determine the causes of a subject’s 
anxiety. Indeed, these devices are not very accurate in determining the 
difference between anxiety and general arousal.  
The members of the Israeli intelligence service and law enforcement 
agencies have become quite adept at detecting lies in potential terrorists. They 
did not achieve success by way of thermal imaging, but through a careful study 
of, and prolonged exposure to, the suspect’s behaviour. Officials engage in 
extended conversations with subjects and then make a judgement concerning 
the truth or falsity of the subject’s story.33 This naturalized approach to lie-
detection is an art form that is time-intensive and takes into account semantic, 
emotional, syntactical, and bodily cues. It is a holistic approach to lie-
detection that cannot be approximated by an analysis of the thermal image of 
a subject’s face. Thermal imaging seems to be a good first line of defence, but 
the discussion of PGM indicates that there may be a tendency to become 
mesmerized by the technological capabilities of these devices and allow them 
to take the place of human judgement subject to ethical evaluations. In short, 
we run the risk of developing a false confidence in this sort of technology. 
With this confidence may come a kind of complacency in our ability to make 
judgements – both ethical and practical.       
The discrete character of thermal imaging cameras will eventually allow 
this sort of screening to be accomplished without disrupting the subjects of 
the investigation. This is a beneficial development, but it also raises questions 
concerning the legality and ethicality of these types of monitoring devices: are 
these “mental searches” ethically viable alternatives if subjects do not submit 
to them? Will these approaches be used more frequently as their subtlety and 
discreteness increases? Is this direct correlation a cause for concern?   
A similar set of question might be posed in reference to what Etzioni calls 
“public protective technologies” that have recently been developed to regulate 
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and screen the uses of the Internet.34 In 2000, the FBI unveiled Carnivore, a 
computer program designed to sift through the stream of many millions of 
messages between individuals who may, or may not, be engaging in criminal 
activity. As Etzioni notes, many ISPs do this sifting themselves and pass along 
information to authorities when a warrant is obtained. If the ISP is not able to 
do this, however, Carnivore is.35 Carnivore’s filters are set in accordance with 
legal court orders, but these filters are necessarily general and include the 
communications of many other users than just the suspects. Despite 
Carnivore’s breadth (the ability to filter millions of messages in a short period 
of time), it lacks depth (the ability to break encrypted code, the likes of which 
are used in many electronic correspondences).36 This is where Magic Lantern 
comes in. As compared to “keystroke capture” devices such as the Key Logger 
System (KLS), which have to be manually (and covertly) installed on a 
suspect’s computer, this device is considerably less invasive. Like the Key 
Logger System, it does not decrypt particular emails, but grants authorities 
access to a suspect’s password. Instead of placing additional hardware on a 
subject’s computer, as does KLS, Magic Lantern allows the FBI to place 
software on a computer by way of a virus-like program. Just like a virus, Magic 
Lantern can be imported into a suspect’s computer by way of the Internet. The 
American Civil Liberties Union compares the use of both of these devices to 
agents ripping “open each and every mail bag and search for one person’s 
letters” and tapping an entire phone system instead of targeting just one 
caller.37   
CONCLUSION 
The advent of highly specific technologies, often employed for the screening of 
people, their communications with others, and patterns in their behaviour, 
leads us back to the issue of “targeting” which rested at the centre of the 
debate concerning PGM. While military targeting in homeland defence 
departs in significant respects from the “targeting” or identification of 
particular individuals who jeopardize homeland security, certain similarities 
warrant discussion as Homeland Security and the SAFETY Act take shape in 
the coming years. As suggested in the sections focusing on precision-guided 
munitions, as the political, material, and economic costs of employing 
technologies declines, the prevalence and frequency of their use tends to 
increase regardless of the ethical implications.  Indeed, the sheer utility and 
effectiveness of security technologies may seem to make discussions 
concerning their ethical use almost superfluous. Even in light of judicial 
oversight and warrant requirements, analytic descriptions of capabilities are 
often conflated with normative prescriptions or designations. This rationale 
may prevail in homeland security if the reason to “target” citizens and visitors 
is reduced to the fact that it is easy to do so with the help of affordable 
precision technologies. Technical capabilities appear ethical in their ease of 
use, their precision, and their cost-effectiveness. Such appearances, however, 
should not deceive us. The first step in initiating an ethical discussion 
concerning security technologies is to recognize that there are ethical 
decisions to make, that technology itself cannot answer these questions, and 
that these questions deepen and multiply as technological capabilities 
increase.    
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In outlining the PATRIOT Act, the attorney general stated that he planned 
to “shine the light of justice” on wrongdoers. This essay has suggested that the 
light to which Ashcroft refers does not necessarily emanate from “justice,” but 
from highly specific technologies that may be easily masked in the rhetoric of 
justice. When Martin Heidegger gave his lecture on “The Question Concerning 
Technology” in 1955, his main concern was the way in which technological 
know-how may come to dominate the entire field of human knowledge and 
judgement. He suggests that technology is a “way of revealing,” a way of 
ordering things to “stand by,” a way of putting things and people “on call for a 
further ordering.”38 This suggestion strikes at the heart of Ashcroft’s 
understanding of shining the light of justice on potential terrorists.  Many 
security technologies, used in either just or unjust projects, place people “on 
call for a further ordering” and demand that they stand by or stand trial.  The 
risk involved in the use of modern technology in homeland security is that it 
may overshadow other forms of reflective judgement, and that its impressive 
capabilities may distract us from the sobering discussion of ethics. In a 
commentary on Heidegger’s lecture, David Krell states that the “question 
concerning technology confronts the supreme danger, which is that this one 
way of revealing beings may overwhelm man and beings and all other possible 
ways of revealing.”39 Krell and Heidegger are onto something here. There is a 
supreme danger that technological ways of revealing will become synonymous 
with “shining the light of justice” on potential enemies. There is the danger of 
confusing technical capabilities and just norms.        
At this point it seem wise to return to the ethical balancing act that Ashcroft 
outlined in his comment after September 11, 2001: “We always have to be 
careful that the rights which America stands for are protected, but we also 
have to understand that in order for those rights to be enjoyed, they have to be 
protected.”40 Security technologies, however, do not help us negotiate the dual 
commitment of rights and protection. Indeed, the fact that technological 
“progress” risks becoming equated to ethical progress will make moral 
questions harder to frame and harder to answer. We must hone our ethical 
senses and sensibilities in order to keep up with the technical know-how that 
broadens the field of possible strategic choices.     
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Evaluating the Impact of Contextual Background Fusion on 
Unclassified Homeland Security Intelligence  
Charles S. Eaneff, Jr. 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing recognizes that state, local, and 
tribal governments “carry out their counterterrorism responsibilities within the broader 
context of their core mission(s)…”1 In order for this national strategy to be successful, 
intelligence provided to these state, local, and tribal recipients must also be presented 
within the context of these core missions. Multiple initiatives have ensured that these 
non-traditional recipients (NTR) in law enforcement, fire, emergency medical services 
(EMS), emergency management, public health, and the private sector are now receiving 
unclassified intelligence products from multiple sources including the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Fusion Centers, 
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), and Terrorism Early Warning Groups (TEWG). 
However, simply pushing intelligence products to non traditional recipients (NTR) is 
not enough. As discussed in a Markle Foundation Working Group Report, Networking 
of Federal Government Agencies with State and Local Government and Private Sector 
Entities, “…adequate context for homeland security providers to effectively utilize 
information is specific, tailored for each local entity, rapidly disseminated, and does not 
overburden recipients with vague or irrelevant information.”2 The Final 9/11 
Commission Report noted the importance of context in decision making, reporting  that 
the president was provided intelligence “news without… much context” prior to 
September 11, 2001, contributing to a failure of decision makers to recognize that Bin 
Laden posed a “novel danger.”3  
This paper does not attempt to determine whether providing classified or unclassified 
intelligence to NTR is an effective strategy. The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing 
Plan cites the need to “identify technical means to aid and expedite the production of 
unclassified ‘tear line’ reports.”4 Department of Justice “Fusion Center Guidelines” 
(2006) document guidelines on the sharing of unclassified intelligence. The National 
Strategy for Homeland Security (2007) outlines the need to share intelligence with all 
levels of government. Clearly, the choice to share unclassified intelligence products has 
already been made. This article explains the impact of implementing contextual 
background fusion (CBF) with intelligence already provided to NTR in terms of the 
perceived value and quality of that intelligence.   
Policy demands that more intelligence be shared with NTR; for that intelligence to be 
effectively utilized, decision makers must perceive both the value and quality of that 
intelligence.5 Providing unclassified intelligence “on demand, in context” (a motto of the 
Congressional Research Service) is critical for millions of employees in NTR disciplines 
who incorporate that context into day-to-day decision making in public contacts, policy 
development, strategy, and tactics.  In the absence of CBF by intelligence producers, 
open Internet searches by intelligence recipients can prove entirely inaccurate, 
degrading both the value and quality of the intelligence. For instance, a Google search 
that might be completed by a homeland security professional searching for contextual 
background on aircraft use in Islamic terrorist attacks, “Islamic terrorists kamikazes 
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weapon aircraft” leads to a “Non Aligned Press Network” story where it is reported that 
the planes on 9/11 were flown utilizing remote controls by individuals in American 
government. The U.S. State Department attempts to identify such misinformation on 
USINFO.STATE.GOV.6 If the intelligence producer fails to provide CBF with their 
product, NTR may find very authentic looking information on the Internet that, when 
combined with timely, accurate, and actionable intelligence, produces poor decisions. 
Failure to control the value and quality of the contextual background that will be utilized 
by NTR to understand intelligence is a failure to ensure the value and quality of that 
intelligence.   
The objective of this study is to improve the value and the quality of homeland 
security information sharing by examining the impact of adopting CBF in intelligence 
sharing. As part of the national information sharing strategy, DHS and FBI provide 
unclassified intelligence to NTR and routinely request feedback on perceived value and 
quality. If CBF is shown to improve DHS/FBI defined value and quality factors, the 
technology utilized must be evaluated for technology acceptance by NTR. Studies using 
the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) have provided empirical support for a positive 
relationship between perceived value/ease of use and technology adoption. 
Allied non-state actors in the private sector control approximately 85 percent of the 
nation’s critical infrastructure in the over 87,000 different U.S. jurisdictions. 7 For every 
federal law enforcement officer, there are approximately five public sector health 
professionals, seven state/local law enforcement officers, ten firefighters and twenty-
one private security professionals, along with countless other public works, emergency 
management and emergency medical professionals.8 As of June 2000, there were 
approximately 708,022 state and local law enforcement officers in the United States.9  
As of June 2002, there were only 93,000 Federal law enforcement officers, or less than 
12% of sworn law enforcement.10 The FBI, lead investigative agency for domestic 
terrorism, had only 12,416 agents as of October 2005, or approximately 1.5% of total law 
enforcement.  In order to maximize our defense against asymmetric threats, we must 
effectively utilize unclassified intelligence to educate these diverse professionals on 
threats, engage them in the intelligence process, and enlist them to provide information 
to federal partners so that appropriate preventative measures can be considered. If 
found to be effective, CBF for NTR would represent a concrete, visible step in the 
transformation from a need-to-know to a need-to-share culture. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 
In the study of philosophy, some believe the understanding of text is dependent on the 
context in which the reader exists. As the text is read, it is interpreted based on the 
social context and bias of the interpreter. Additionally, text has its own “horizon of 
meaning” which is influenced by the contextual background of the writer, the time of 
writing, and the originating context. Philosophical hermeneutics examines the 
relationship between a reader and text, both of which must be understood within the 
context of their experience and creation respectively.11  
In the creation and distribution of unclassified intelligence, hermeneutic fusion is 
problematic; the original process of creation is often based on classified intelligence, 
which may not be fused to an unclassified document. As the author/producer of 
unclassified intelligence is prohibited from the fusion of classified hermeneutic material, 
open source contextual background chosen by authors/producers must be used to 
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replace the original, classified material that influenced the hermeneutic of the writer at 
the time of creation. In this article, contextual background is defined as unclassified 
material that best represents the hermeneutic of the producer at the time of creation. 
Contextual Background and Intelligence Usefulness 
As expressed by John Hillen in the National Review, “U.S. Intelligence Failures stem 
from too much information, not enough understanding.”12 This is a subtle, but critical 
point; even a high quality intelligence product that is not fully understood by NTR may 
lack usefulness, failing to provide the knowledge required to improve decision making. 
The sentiment of Hillen is echoed in CIA reports, outlining that the provision of 
contextual background is a critical component in the usefulness of intelligence products. 
In periods of crisis, when demands are high and response time is short, most 
written intelligence production is in the form of policy-driven memos and briefs 
and pieces written for daily publications. The result of this narrowly focused and 
piecemeal intelligence flow is that it does not foster continuity of analysis nor 
does it provide a context within which to place seemingly unrelated information…  
The Intelligence Community has made substantial, although sporadic, 
efforts over the past decade and a half to explore better and more 
technologically advanced methods of communicating with 
consumers. The results, however, have been modest at best. The 
requirement to have background and contextual information 
available at the policymaker's fingertips in a timely fashion remains 
unfulfilled.13 (Emphasis added) 
Decision makers often demand “tailored” intelligence briefs beyond what is prepared for 
general distribution in order to meet their decision making needs.14 This issue is 
exacerbated by the recent addition of NTR. These recipients do not have personal 
intelligence analysts to produce “tailored” briefs that contain necessary contextual 
background. NTR are often unaccustomed to the intelligence cycle and use of 
intelligence products as their discipline related training and experience did not 
previously require the use of such intelligence. As described by Lisa Palmieri, President 
of the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, 
I also recall thinking that if these executives got what they asked for; 
they would be buried in uncorroborated, unevaluated, “white 
noise”...  This has, unfortunately, come to pass, with law enforcement 
agencies erring on the side of caution; they are sharing more piece-meal 
information than could ever be made useful in case any small detail might 
possibly be deemed important in retrospect.15 (Emphasis added) 
Volumes of information without contextual background can overwhelm NTR and is not 
useful. 
Contextual Background and Decision Making  
There is agreement that contextual background is a critical component in intelligence 
decision making.16 Extensive research exists on decision-making theory, with similarly 
extensive discussion of the impact of intelligence products on decision making.  Context 
is defined as the “sum of all the knowledge possessed by the operators on the whole 
task.”17 
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In a Pomerol and Brézillon model, a decision maker would, when presented with an 
intelligence product, access his or her contextual knowledge, and then proceduralize 
that knowledge based on the intelligence product in hand; in this process, the decision 
maker may also access available external contextual information, incorporating that 
knowledge and proceduralizing it prior to decision making.  Pomerol and Brézillon note, 
“… it is clear that a Palestinian whose prior knowledge is reduced to his Imam’s preaches 
[sic] cannot have the same interpretation of Middle East events as a Harvard 
alumnus.”18  
 
Figure 1: Context (From the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2002) 
 
Understandably, military applications of context in decision making center on 
pragmatic application. Training material utilized by the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) reflects that practical application of context in decision making: 
“…knowledge is produced when information is correlated with a model of the world and 
the current context.”19  
In describing the power of context in terrorism decision making, Professor Fathali 
Moghaddam contends that “terrorism is explained by the power of context”20 
Regardless of whether context and decision making are evaluated through the lens of 
the academic or the war fighter, literature documents that context involved in the 
decision-making process has a significant impact on the nature, quality, and 
effectiveness of the decision.   
Non Traditional Recipients and Contextual Background 
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Robert Steele highlights the value of context in the intelligence process for all recipients: 
New Value is in Content + Context + Speed. The traditional craft of 
intelligence has tended to fragment content from its context, and be 
largely oblivious to timing. This is true both in the collection cycle and in the 
production cycle. The new craft of intelligence recognizes that the value of 
any given information, apart from its relevance to the decision at hand, 
stems from a combination of the content in context, and the content 
in time.21 (Emphasis Added) 
Steele understands that the value of intelligence is not based solely on the sources 
utilized in the intelligence product, and that “historical knowledge,” (referenced by 
Pomerol and Brézillon as “contextual knowledge”) is a critical factor in the value of 
intelligence products. This research identifies the impact of avoiding “fracturing content 
from its context,” by fusing content (existing intelligence products) + context (vetted, 
valid, and accurate) + speed (hyperlink fusion) for non traditional recipients. Speed 
through hyperlink fusion leverages the attention span of the reader, providing 
contextual background at the exact moment the issue is facing the reader.  (Hyperlinks 
are words, phrases or pictures that can be “clicked” when a cursor passes over, 
redirecting the reader to another web page or section of the page.  Hyperlinks are also 
referred to as “clickable links” or “links.”) 
Technology and Contextual Background 
The literature shows that decision making is impaired when insufficient information is 
available; it also documents that too much information (or information overload) 
impairs decision-making. Technology has the potential to impair decision making 
through the provision of too much information (the “white noise” discussed by Lisa 
Palmieri) or to assist by increasing a decision maker’s ability to acquire, transform, and 
explore knowledge as envisioned by the IC. Technological assistance in providing the 
right amount and type of knowledge to decision makers has the potential to improve 
decisions, increase decision timeliness, and decrease staff support requirements. Given 
the lack of intelligence specialists in NTR disciplines outside of law enforcement, and 
the fact that 79 percent of police departments have twenty-five or fewer sworn officers, 
technology support is critical if we are to effectively engage NTR in homeland security.22 
Intelligence products with CBF can function as a critical hub or node in networking 
multiple databases of open source contextual background and NTR; the producer 
(expert) manages the interface between the warehouses and NTR through the selection 
of appropriate hyperlinks. The diagram below outlines the impact of such hyperlinks on 
a small part of the homeland security information network. 
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Understanding the critical importance of improving the usefulness of intelligence 
products for decision makers, the IC has utilized varied methods to provide user-defined 
access to contextual background for intelligence products, including personal briefings 
by intelligence professionals, ongoing feedback as part of the intelligence cycle, along 
with technological solutions such as a finished classified intelligence dissemination 
system (Intelink). The experience with Intelink highlights the importance of technology 
acceptance by decision makers; Intelink is a secure network of intelligence databases 
that supports user defined receipt of customized intelligence products.23 It is intended to 
“provide robust and timely access to all available intelligence information, regardless of 
location, medium, or format, for all interested users…who are authorized access.”24 
Intelink was designed not to just “push” intelligence information; it allows recipients to 
“pull” information as well.25 
Intelink has not been as successful as envisioned. Many intelligence recipients have 
expressed a preference for hard copies of reports, personal briefings, and traditional 
communication methods over Intelink.26 As reflected in Technology Acceptance Model 
research, ease of use and perceived usefulness are significant factors in the successful 
implementation of any solution. Despite the extensive capabilities of Intelink, users 
“claim they go first to the Agency web sites, find no information at all, usually become 
quickly frustrated, and log off with the impression the intelligence agencies do not store 
information on Intelink.”27 Intelligence system design must support the needs and 
preferences of decision makers or run the risk of rejection, regardless of how exceptional 
the technology or the potential of the system. 
Technology Acceptance 
The theory of reasoned actions (TRA) serves as a theoretical base for examining 
technology acceptance.28 TRA posits that an individual’s beliefs influence his or her 
attitudes that, when combined with societal norms, drive behavioral intentions, leading 
to actual behavior.  Based on TRA, the technology acceptance model (TAM) is an 
established method of predicting user acceptance. In this model, perceived “ease of use” 
and perceived “usefulness” explain why individuals accept or do not accept technology.29 
A review of previous studies shows that TAM, with strong empirical support, has 
become a dominant model for predicting technology adoption.30 TAM is one method to 
predict user acceptance before large scale investment or commitment to a technology in 
mission critical systems. 
Of the two constructs, it appears that usefulness is critical; “no amount of ease of use 
can compensate for a system that does not perform a useful function.”31 The use of 
technology in knowledge management systems has been studied using TAM to 
determine factors that impact loyal use; both perceived usefulness and ease of use were 
found to be factors positively related to loyal use.32 
HYPOTHESIS 
H1:    CBF increases customer satisfaction “value” for NTR as defined by DHS/FBI. 
H2: CBF increases customer satisfaction “quality” for NTR as defined by 
DHS/FBI. 
H3: NTR find hyperlink technology applications in unclassified intelligence as 
“easy to use” as defined by technology acceptance model research. 
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H4:  NTR perceive hyperlink technology applications in unclassified intelligence 
as “useful” as defined by technology acceptance model research. 
H5:  Given a choice, NTR believe a CBF intelligence document is of greater value 
to themselves and their organization than a non CBF product.  
Hypothesis Testing 
A null hypothesis (Ho) is a hypothesis that can be statistically examined.  It is presumed 
to be true until statistical analysis demonstrates it to be false, or nullified, in which case 
the alternative hypothesis (H1) may be accepted. A null hypothesis can be designed to 
test that there is no difference between variables; it is then evaluated and the results 
examined to determine what the probability is that observed differences between 
variables are by chance. In determining whether to reject the null hypothesis in favor of 
the alternative hypothesis, we must determine an appropriate level of significance that 
must be met to reject the null hypothesis. The smaller this p-value is, the more 
significant the result; 5% or .05 is generally accepted as significant, while 1% or .01 is 
more statistically powerful, as it is a much more difficult threshold to meet. In this 
article the following two null hypotheses are evaluated to determine whether to accept 
the alternative hypothesis: 
Value 
Ho:  There is no difference in intelligence product perceived value as represented by 
DHS/FBI customer satisfaction surveys, on average, with the application of CBF. 
H1:  An intelligence product with hyperlinks to open source contextual background is 
perceived as more valuable based on DHS/FBI customer satisfaction surveys than a 
non-CBF product, on average. 
Quality 
Ho:  There is no difference in intelligence product perceived quality as represented by 
DHS/FBI customer satisfaction surveys, on average, with the application of CBF. 
H1:  An intelligence product with hyperlinks to open source contextual background is 
perceived as higher quality based on DHS/FBI customer satisfaction surveys than a 
non-CBF product, on average. 
METHODOLOGY 
A control product was presented and a base measurement of DHS/FBI quality and value 
factors was established. The experimental CBF product was presented and a second 
measurement of DHS/FBI quality and value factors was recorded, establishing the 
positive or negative impact of CBF on the customer satisfaction factors established by 
DHS/FBI. Questions from previously validated technology acceptance model factors of 
ease of use and usefulness were then presented in order to determine if intelligence 
recipients would accept hyperlinks to achieve CBF. A final forced choice question to 
determine preference for control or experimental products was presented to confirm 
DHS/FBI factor results. 
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Instrument Construction 
Two identical sample intelligence products were produced for the survey: one text file as 
similar as practical to a typical intelligence product distributed to non traditional 
recipients and a second identical product fused with hyperlinks to contextual 
background (CBF). The material in the sample report was unclassified, having been 
adapted from the Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Project Eco-Radicalism, 
open source, online report, allowing this research to remain unclassified.33 The 
intelligence sample product was distributed to four intelligence subject matter experts 
from local, county, state, and federal jurisdictions and based on their feedback the 
sample was shortened. 
The survey was prepared for “Zoomerang” online distribution. A standard 
intelligence product was presented; seven questions were asked that mirror DHS/FBI 
value and quality surveys, then a CBF intelligence product was presented along with the 
same seven questions. These questions provide direct feedback to DHS/FBI on the 
impact of CBF on the exact measures that they seek from their “customers.” These 
questions utilized the same five-point Likert scale as DHS/FBI products, with Strongly 
Disagree on one end and Strongly Agree on the other end, along with an N/A option.  
One question from the DHS/FBI Customer Satisfaction Survey regarding timeliness was 
not utilized – “The product was delivered within established guidelines” – as the sample 
product was not being delivered based on guidelines. All other customer satisfaction 
survey questions and Likert scale are exactly as found in DHS/FBI documents. 
Twelve additional questions directly related to ease of use and usefulness consistent 
with the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) were then presented. A factor analysis 
was conducted to verify that the questions within ease of use and usefulness factors 
moved together and were in fact measuring distinct factors. The twelve additional 
questions were adapted from Technology Acceptance Model research first validated by 
Davis in 1989. In this model, the two factors of “Usefulness” and “Ease of Use” have 
been demonstrated to predict the use of technology.34 The questions in these factors 
utilized an ordinal Likert 6-point scale with Strongly Disagree at one extreme and 
Strongly Agree at the other end. A final question in the survey asked respondents to 
directly identify whether a CBF or standard product would be of greater value to their 
organization. 
The pilot study was sent to fifteen subject matter experts in public health, fire, 
emergency management, and law enforcement who suggested a “header” and “legalistic 
sounding disclaimer” to make the survey look more realistic, as well as changing one 
jurisdiction choice from “city” to “local.” After making these adjustments, the survey was 
distributed to the target audience, who were requested to complete the survey and 
forward the survey to other homeland security professionals. As this research utilizes 
customer satisfaction survey questions from DHS and the FBI, a bifurcated sampling 
method was utilized.  In one frame invitations to participate in the survey were emailed 
to current and former students of the DHS-sponsored Center for Homeland Defense 
and Security (CHDS). These students, all of whom were selected by DHS to attend the 
school, include diverse homeland security disciplines including police, fire, public 
health, military, EMS, and emergency management. This sampling frame is intended to 
represent intelligence recipients of interest to DHS. As every current and former student 
was invited to participate, these students represent the entire universe of CHDS 
students and no further sampling was needed to survey this population. 
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A second sampling frame consisted of former students of the FBI National Academy 
(FBINA). Similar to the CHDS program, each student attending the FBINA is sponsored 
and selected by one of the fifty-six FBI Field Offices. Each student attending the FBINA 
is a member of law enforcement, representing local, county, state, and international 
jurisdictions. By 2005, over 38,000 students from 220 sessions had attended FBINA, so 
further sampling was required. Several domestic students from FBINA session 214 were 
selected to represent intelligence recipients of interest to the FBI. A total of 172 email 
invitations to participate in the survey were sent to current and former homeland 
security professionals sponsored by the FBI or DHS to attend these courses. Snowball-
style secondary distribution by these initial recipients was encouraged. 
DHS/FBI Customer Satisfaction Survey Questions 
Quality: 
1. The product was timely and relevant to your mission, programs, priorities, or 
initiatives. 
2. The product was clear and logical in the presentation of information with 
supported judgments and conclusions. 
3. The product is reliable; i.e., sources well documented and reputable. 
Value: 
1. The product would contribute to satisfying intelligence gaps or predicating 
cases or intelligence operations, especially previously unknown areas. 
2. The product would result in a change in investigative or intelligence priorities 
and/or a shift from unaddressed to addressed work, or vice versa. 
3. The product would result in more informed decisions concerning investigative 
or intelligence initiatives and/or resource allocation. 
4. The product would identify new information associated with pending matters 
or offered insights into information that could change the working premise in 
a program or initiative. 
Technology Acceptance Model 
Perceived usefulness: 
1. Using the intelligence product with hyperlinks in my job would enable me to 
accomplish tasks more quickly. 
2. Using intelligence products with hyperlinks would improve my job 
performance. 
3. Using intelligence products with hyperlinks would increase my productivity. 
4. Using intelligence products with hyperlinks would enhance my effectiveness 
on the job. 
5. Using intelligence products with hyperlinks would make it easier to do my job 
6. I would find intelligence products with hyperlinks useful in my job. 
Perceived ease of use: 
1. Learning to utilize intelligence products with hyperlinks would be easy for me. 
2. I would find it easy to use intelligence hyperlinks to obtain decision-making 
information. 
3. My interaction with the intelligence product with hyperlinks was clear and 
understandable. 
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4. I found the intelligence hyperlinks to be flexible to interact with. 
5. It would be easy for me to become skillful at using intelligence products with 
hyperlinks. 
6. I found the intelligence product with hyperlinks easy to use. 
Preference 
1. Which type of intelligence product would be of greater value to you and your 
organization? 
The data obtained from the online survey was downloaded into a Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS) program for descriptive, bivariate, multivariate, correlation, 
regression, and reliability analysis. 
SURVEY FINDINGS 
Demographics 
The sample contained 285 responses. Six discipline choices were offered in the survey; 
law enforcement was the largest single represented discipline with 35.1 percent of 
responses. Six jurisdictions were represented; the largest single jurisdiction was local 
respondents at 41.1 percent. The largest single discipline/jurisdiction respondent 
combination was local law enforcement, with fifty individual responses or 17.5 percent 
of total respondents, followed by local fire at 14.4 percent.  
Perceived Value and Quality 
The Wilcoxon test conducted examines the hypothesis that there is no difference in 
perceived quality and value between standard and CBF products. This was not the case; 
the observed increased perception in both value and quality was statistically significant 
and would occur fewer than once every thousand times if there really was no difference 
in perceived quality or value. While not included in the original hypothesis’, the 
Wilcoxon test on each of the seven questions comprising the DHS/FBI quality and value 
measures would occur fewer than once every thousand times if there really were no 
difference between the standard and CBF products. The CBF product was rated higher 
by an overwhelming margin, from three to sixteen times higher on individual variables. 
Reject H0: There is no difference in intelligence product perceived value as 
represented by DHS/FBI customer satisfaction surveys, on average, with the application 
of CBF to open sources in favor of H1.  An intelligence product with CBF to open sources 
is perceived as more valuable based on DHS/FBI customer satisfaction surveys than a 
non- CBF product, on average. 
Reject H0: There is no difference in intelligence product perceived quality as 
represented by DHS/FBI customer satisfaction surveys, on average, with the application 
of CBF to open sources in favor of H1.  An intelligence product with CBF to open sources 
is perceived as higher quality based on DHS/FBI customer satisfaction surveys than a 
non-CBF product, on average. 
Conclusions: Technology Acceptance 
With a mode of five of six on every question, respondents showed overwhelming 
acceptance of hyperlink technology. 
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Standard vs. CBF Forced Choice Results 
The final Likert question, “Which type of intelligence product would be of greater value 
to you and your organization?” represented a direct choice for subjects between CBF and 
standard unclassified intelligence products. Of respondents, 65.8 percent indicated the 
strongest possible preference for the hyperlinked option offered, producing both a 
median and mode of six with a mean of 5.45. This indicates that, given a choice, 
homeland security professionals overwhelmingly preferred the CBF product. 
 Although variation between disciplines is to be expected, all disciplines and 
jurisdictions uniformly preferred the CBF product with means ranging from 5.1 to 5.67 
on the six-point Likert scale with law enforcement, fire, local, and private sector 





Other  5.38 
Federal  5.49 
State  5.41 
County  5.13 
Local  5.57 
Private Sector  5.67 
Total  5.45 
 
Discipline  Greater Value  
Other  5.43 
Public Health  5.10 
Law Enforcement  5.60 
Fire  5.59 
EMS  5.43 
Emergency Management  5.33 
Total  5.45 
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CBF has been demonstrated to be one tool that can assist in meeting the demands and 
recommendations of the Markle Foundation, NTR, the 9/11 Commission, California 
Police Chiefs, DHS, Major City Police Chiefs, the CIA, the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, the National Infrastructure Advisory Council, and the RAND 
Corporation. CBF of unclassified intelligence for NTR contributes toward: 
• “...news…in context.” (9/11 Commission)35 
•  “…adequate context for homeland security providers to effectively utilize 
information…specific, tailored for each local entity, rapidly disseminated, and 
does not overburden recipients with vague or irrelevant information.” (Markle 
Foundation)36 
• Improves law enforcement perception of intelligence quality and value. 
(California Police Chiefs)37 
• Is a “better method of sharing intelligence with state and local law enforcement 
agencies?” (DHS)38 
• Contributes toward providing “adequate…background…for 700,000 officers on 
the street.” (Major City Police Chiefs)39 
• “…Harness(es) the power of information technology…” (Markle Foundation)40 
• Provides “background and contextual information available at…policymaker’s 
fingertips in a timely fashion...” (CIA)41 
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• Moves toward “full integration of (the) private sector into the intelligence 
cycle.” (National Infrastructure Advisory Council)42 
• Encourages “effective partnership with state and local government and the 
private sector…” (National Strategy for Homeland Security)43 
• Is “tailored to meet requests from government departments, police, and 
private industry.” (RAND) 44 
Research has found that even well-educated decision makers who understand the power 
of statistical testing often rely on analogies or metaphors to change deeply held beliefs; 
analogical reasoning combined with statistical analysis is more effective in changing 
those beliefs than statistics alone.45 
One contextual metaphor/urban legend about the FBI describes how J. Edgar Hoover 
demanded short memos with wide margins (in order to make notations), then received a 
memo with narrow margins. He promptly returned the memo with the notation, “Watch 
the borders.” Subordinates promptly sent hundreds of agents to guard our national 
borders with Canada and Mexico! 
Whether it is as expensive as sending hundreds of agents to the borders, or as critical 
as meeting the unclassified intelligence needs of millions of homeland security 
professionals, context matters. This research demonstrates that through CBF it is 
practical for the Intelligence Community to provide NTR the context required to make 
good decisions. Context that is consistent with the hermeneutic of the originating 
agency, is immediately available to decision makers, is “fused” to keywords, is available 
to over 87,000 jurisdictions, improves both quality and value of intelligence products, 
and utilizes technology that is widely accepted. 
LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
The original list of survey recipients, although geographically diverse, was based on two 
advanced educational programs, which may introduce bias in the results; these 
professionals had attended the FBI National Academy or the Naval Postgraduate School 
Center for Homeland Defense and Security. As DHS and the FBI jointly distribute 
unclassified intelligence products, and the questions utilized in the survey were in part 
based on their joint customer satisfaction survey, it is believed that sending the survey 
to students of a DHS-sponsored and FBI-sponsored program would represent a 
reasonable target audience for DHS/FBI intelligence products. Original distribution 
may not adequately represent the technological diversity of homeland security 
professionals, given the online format of NPS CHDS and leadership positions of FBINA 
graduates. Pilot study subject matter expert (SME) feedback, participant free-form 
comments, and demographic results reflect stronger ecological validity than external 
validity; while the survey was originally widely distributed, the anonymous nature of 
feedback and low frequency of individual jurisdiction/discipline responses demands 
caution interpreting individual discipline and jurisdiction results. 
The “snowball” distribution style, where those who were originally requested to 
participate were encouraged to redistribute to their homeland security contacts, reduces 
validity, while increasing sample size. This distribution style can introduce bias as it 
reduces the likelihood that the respondents represent an appropriate population 
sample. Secondary distribution by these recipients, not controlled by the researcher, was 
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intended to similarly represent the target audience of the DHS and the FBI; the extent to 
which this sample does not represent the target audience of these agencies represents 
potential bias in the survey results.46 
    As the survey responses were anonymous, recipients who visited the site or only 
partially completed the survey, then came back to complete the survey, registered as a 
visit, a partial, and a complete response. Therefore only completed survey data were 
utilized for research, and the resulting visit/partial/complete response rates are not 
utilized.  285 Total surveys completed were 285, 182 partial responses were not utilized, 
and the website was visited a total of 648 times. From this data, the response rate may 
have been anywhere from 44 to 100 percent. Not knowing the true response rate is a 
limitation in this research. 
The sample was derived from DHS- and FBI-sponsored educational programs that do 
not generally include private sector participants. As a result, the two million private-
sector security professionals are under-represented in this research.   
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Research has outlined the critical impact of context on decision making, the importance 
of intelligence in homeland security, the need to involve millions of diverse homeland 
security professionals in asymmetric conflict, and the importance of technology in 
intelligence operations. Statistical analysis of the data indicates that hyper linking 
unclassified intelligence products to open source contextual background (CBF) increases 
the perceived value and quality of that intelligence. Given a choice, homeland security 
professionals overwhelmingly preferred a CBF product, 268 to sixteen. Observed 
increases in perceived value and quality and clear preference for CBF in intelligence 
products make it clear that CBF positively impacts information sharing as demanded by 
national directives, initiatives, and homeland security professionals. Strong ease of use 
and usefulness findings across disciplines and jurisdictions predict that NTR will use 
this technology if employed in unclassified intelligence production and distribution. In 
order to improve information sharing to and between NTR as demanded, the following 
recommendations should be considered. 
First, the Office of the Program Director for the Information Sharing Environment 
and unclassified intelligence producers with the capability should immediately fuse 
vetted, accurate, open source contextual background to their intelligence products 
through the use of hyperlink technology. The newly created Federal Coordinating Group 
(FCG) at the National Counterterrorism Center provides a timely opportunity to 
introduce CBF into unclassified intelligence distributed nationwide. 
Homeland security professionals have expressed acceptance of hyperlink technology 
in unclassified intelligence distribution. Intelligence producers such as NYPD have 
successfully integrated other technologies such as PowerPoint into unclassified 
intelligence production and advanced contextual background technology such as 
“Intelink,” “K2,” “Profiler,” and “Autonomy” are successfully used in classified 
intelligence systems in order to reduce the time it takes for analysts to identify links and 
discover previously unidentified links. In order to eliminate or minimize the time it 
takes for analysts to identify appropriate hyperlinks for use in CBF, search criteria that 
limits responses to .mil, .gov, and websites previously identified as accurate and credible 
can be shared between analysts. Whether through technology or shared resources, the 
time required to identify appropriate hyperlinks must be minimized so that it is equal to 
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or less than the time saved by the production of a one page CBF product versus a longer 
standard product. This DHS-sponsored research has demonstrated the acceptance of 
technology across a broad range of homeland security disciplines and the effectiveness 
of TAM in evaluating technology prior to widespread homeland security application. 
Second, DHS should immediately sponsor research to determine what other 
technologies, including contextual background systems such as K2, Profiler, Autonomy, 
and community-of-interest search systems, would be acceptable and improve perceived 
value and quality in unclassified intelligence products. Technology that is found useful 
and easy to use should be considered for widespread application to improve information 
sharing. 
This research has demonstrated that statistically significant improvements in 
DHS/FBI-defined perceived value and quality factors, along with strong TAM ease of 
use and usefulness factor ratings, are possible with the addition of open source 
contextual background to unclassified intelligence. NTR found the simple addition of 
contextual background to unclassified intelligence improved that intelligence, 
contributing to improved information sharing as demanded by national directives, 
initiatives, and homeland security professionals. 
Third, the Department of Homeland Security should sponsor research into what 
other information, data, or intelligence components would improve perceived quality 
and value of unclassified intelligence products for NTR. The preferred length of 
unclassified intelligence, the optimal amount of contextual background, the inclusion of 
sources for further information, citations, and the fusion of related online training to 
unclassified intelligence products are examples of changes to unclassified intelligence 
that should be evaluated utilizing TAM. 
The regional fusion center concept has demonstrated an ability to coordinate multiple 
disciplines in counter terrorism efforts. 
Finally, the Department of Homeland Security should continue to support the fusion 
center concept, encouraging the use of these centers to “tailor” intelligence to the unique 
needs of their multidisciplinary partners and geographic areas of responsibility, 
consistent with study recommendations. Additionally, DHS should sponsor research 
into additional methods of geographic “tailoring” of unclassified intelligence. 
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Recent Patterns of Terrorism Prevention 
in the United Kingdom 
 
Larry R. Irons 
INTRODUCTION 
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was the basic internal security threat to 
the United Kingdom over the past 100 years. In particular, more than 3,600 people died 
during the “Troubles” (1969-1996). However, authorities no longer consider Irish 
paramilitary organizations the country’s major terrorist threat.1 The major terrorist 
challenge to the UK today comes from international terrorist groups affiliated with al 
Qaeda. Until recently, the nexus of the affiliation with al Qaeda was Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. Recent attacks suggest a nexus with Iraq as well. However, the emergence 
of a new threat such as al Qaeda does not mean that intelligence analysts’ thinking, 
conditioned to meet one threat, e.g. PIRA, adjusts readily to the new threat.2 The 
analysis here highlights this issue in the recent patterns of terrorism prevention in the 
UK. 
Three agencies make up the national intelligence and security services in the UK, The 
Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) – the nation’s external intelligence agency overseen by 
the foreign secretary; the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) – which 
develops signals intelligence, also overseen by the foreign secretary; and the Security 
Service (MI5), which operates under the authority of the home secretary to conduct 
surveillance operations. Observers often refer to the three services as the Agencies. MI5 
has no arrest powers of its own, meaning its effectiveness in preempting terrorist 
operations depends largely on collaboration with the Special Branch (SB) of local police 
forces’, especially the Metropolitan Police Department’s Special Branch (MPSB).3  
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks (9/11) in the United States, the government 
of the UK assumed the consensus opinion that the Agencies had failed to recognize the 
significance of al Qaeda.4 As a result, MI5 established the Joint Terrorism Analysis 
Centre (JTAC). JTAC was hailed as “the most significant structural development within 
the intelligence community,” pooling international terrorism intelligence in one central 
location “under the direction of one central authority, the director-general of MI5.”5 
Islamic extremists either attempted attacks, or successfully attacked, the UK in the 
summers of 2005 and 2007. In addition to actual attacks, the Agencies disrupted 
numerous plots within the UK by terrorist groups over the past few years. The 
discussion below analyzes patterns in the prevention activities of the intelligence, 
security, and police services of the UK by examining three terrorist attacks, but 
principally the most devastating one on July 7, 2005 (7 July) as well as the two most 
complex preempted plots.  
Following William Pelfrey’s seminal article on the cycle of preparedness framework,6 
the analysis here uses the Prevention Cube model7 (see Figure 1) to explore the 
relationship between terrorist attacks in the UK that occurred since 7 July, and key plots 
in which authorities successfully intervened to preempt attacks. To do so requires a 
common framework for analyzing “successful” and “unsuccessful” attack plots. Just as 
effective collaboration and information sharing provide a basis for recognizing threats, 
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and deciding whether to intervene to preempt them, so can ineffective collaboration and 
information sharing result in failure to develop opportunities for preemption.  
Pelfrey characterizes the importance of prevention to the Cycle of Preparedness in the 
following manner: “The Cycle of Preparedness places greater weight on Prevention…It 
does not carry with it the assumption that there must be an incident as an initiator of 
the Cycle. Indeed, an organization or jurisdiction 
must simultaneously prepare for prevention 
activities, response capacity, and recovery 
capabilities.”8 The Prevention Cube is a "thinking 
tool", a heuristic device, useful in analyzing the way 
prevention principles inform risk management and 
enable preemption of terrorist threats. It draws 
from the Cycle of Preparedness framework, yet 
focuses specifically on prevention, representing the 
prevention process as a set of steps (front side – 
Figure 1) that involve preparedness professionals 
working together and sharing information to 
recognize threats posed to communities.  
Individuals plotting terrorist attacks make 
strategic choices to develop specific capabilities 
based on what they see as vulnerable targets. A 
targeted community can also make choices that 
lessen its vulnerabilities (top side – Figure 1) and 
identify the weakness of potential attackers’  
capabilities. The Prevention Cube exemplifies how  
key variables of the prevention process relate. Although it implies steps of prevention 
occur in a sequence, that sequence (front side – Figure 1) doesn’t have an exact start or 
finish, nor do collaboration, information sharing, or threat recognition activities happen 
in any particular order. The purpose of the prevention process is to manage the risks 
posed by existing threats and vulnerabilities, and make decisions about how and when 
to intervene against threats (right side – Figure 1) to protect against them, deter them, 
or preempt them (top side – Figure 1). Authorities can intervene against threats when 
the risk posed is in: 
1. Primary Mode: An intervention to reduce risk when specific threats are 
unknown but a threat capability, or vulnerability, is recognized. 
2. Secondary Mode: An intervention to reduce risk after a specific threat is 
recognized but no immediate threat exists. 
3. Tertiary Mode: An intervention to reduce, or preempt, a threat that 
poses a clear-and-present danger.9 
 
The following analysis explores several successful and preempted (unsuccessful) 
terrorist plots in the United Kingdom. We explore the way the Agencies collaborated 
and shared information to identify threats posed by al Qaeda. Specifically, the analysis 
herein uses the Prevention Cube as an interpretive resource to analyze recent patterns of 
terrorism prevention in the United Kingdom. The discussion examines the patterns of 
collaboration, information sharing, threat recognition, risk management, and decisions 
Figure 1 – Prevention Cube 
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by the Agencies to intervene against a range of terrorist plots. Each section of the 
analysis focuses on one of the five steps in the Prevention Cube framework relative to 
specific activities taken by the Agencies to manage the risks posed by al Qaeda to the 
United Kingdom. 
As explained below, the prevention process is not simply a set of linear steps – 
especially the process of collaborating and sharing information to recognize threats. 
Prevention often involves cycling through opportunities to recognize threat, gauge risks, 
and make decisions about intervening. The cycling can occur multiple times and 
improves in effectiveness when those attempting to prevent terrorist attacks view 
terrorist organizations, particularly al Qaeda, as networks capable of operating without 
an explicit command and control hierarchy.10  
MI5, in particular, missed key opportunities to develop information about the 7 July 
and 21 July terrorist plots in large part because its risk management strategy failed to 
use a network conception of terrorist cells and connections between cells. Rather, the 
available open source information indicates MI5 selected avenues of investigation based 
largely on a hierarchical model of an investigative target’s relationship to foreign al 
Qaeda operatives or associates. While recognizing the network of relationships 
underlying a terrorist organization is certainly easier after the fact, failing to use a 
network conception of terrorist organization against al Qaeda in the prevention process 
makes successful preemption less likely.11 
THE CONTEXT 
The Agencies are facing an ongoing threat by Islamic extremists as evidenced in the 
frequency of attacks and ongoing plots in the United Kingdom. The Agencies preempted 
several attack plots over the past few years. Several attacks occurred as well, though only 
one actually resulted in a successful execution with lethal consequences. The following 
analysis examines the patterns of activity common to both types of attack plot. 
Preempted Attacks 
Details about the fertilizer bomb investigation from 2004, Operation Crevice, became 
available once the trial started in 2006 and after the verdicts in 2007. Operation Crevice 
is the name given to an investigation into a 2004 plot to build a car bomb using 
ammonium nitrate fertilizer. At the time, it was the most complex counterterrorism 
operation ever undertaken in the UK. In the spring of 2007, five men received life 
sentences for their roles in the plot.12 
The liquid bomb plot that targeted commercial airlines in 2006 is still under pretrial 
restriction but salient facts regarding the way authorities disrupted the plot are available 
as we note below.  
Successfully Executed Attacks 
By “successfully executed” we mean the attack plot was carried out. Even though the 
bombs did not explode in two of these three attacks, the plot itself went undiscovered 
and the attackers were able to execute their operation.  
On July 7, 2005 around, 0850, three explosions rocked the London Underground 
System (hereafter the Tube) and one additional explosion ripped through a London bus 
in Tavistock Place. The explosions resulted from suicide bomb attacks by Mohammed 
Siddeque Khan, Hasib Hussein, Shazad Tanweer, and Jermaine Lindsay. The first three 
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were British nationals of Pakistani descent, born and raised in the United Kingdom. 
Lindsay was a British national of West Indian Origin and a Muslim convert. All of the 
bombers on 7 July died in the attack, so investigators developed very little information 
on the plot from them directly. Khan and Tanweer recorded suicide videos while visiting 
Pakistan and that fact made al Qaeda involvement evident, as al Qaeda released the 
videos to the public.13 
On 21 July 2005, between 1235 and 1305, three additional bomb attempts occurred in 
the Tube. Six individuals were charged. In July 2007, a jury convicted Yassin Omar, 
Ramzi Mohammed, Hussain Osman, and Muktar Said Ibrahim, the leader of the plot. 
The same jury failed to reach a verdict on two others, Manfo Kwaku Asiedu and Adel 
Yahya. Police developed information regarding the 21 July plot from the defendants as 
well as other sources. The essential facts relating to the plot became public as the trial 
proceeded. We discuss them below. 
On 29 June 2007, Kafeel Ahmed, Dr Bilal Abdullah, Dr. Mohammed Asha, and Dr 
Sabeel Ahmed attempted to detonate a car bomb outside a nightclub in London and, 
after failing to detonate the car bombs, mounted a suicide bomb attack on the Glasgow 
airport on 30 June. The bomb in the attack on the Glasgow airport also failed to 
detonate, with Ahmed incurring burns on 90 percent of his body and dying in early 
August. Bilal Adbullah, Mohammed Asha, and Sabeel Ahmed are awaiting trial. 
Australian authorities arrested a fourth man, Dr Mohammed Haneef, at the request of 
the UK. Haneef gave his cell phone’s sim card to Kafeel Ahmed for use on a mobile 
phone used in the attack. The Australian authorities subsequently freed Haneef who 
returned to his home in India.  
The government released two official reports following investigations into the lethal 
attacks on 7 July. One report came from the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) 
of Parliament14 and the other in a response of the government to the ISC report.15 Both 
pointed to several shortcomings in efforts by MI5, the Security Service or domestic spy 
service in the United Kingdom, as well as the other security agencies, to prevent the 
attacks.  
The reports relied heavily on witnesses, written assessments, and intelligence reports 
by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) as well as the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre 
(JTAC). Yet information developed from the recently concluded trial of the 21 July 
attackers, as well as developments in the terrorist threat evidenced by the June 2007 
attack attempts in London and Glasgow, add fundamentally to our understanding of 
MI5’s failure to recognize the attackers of 7 July and 21 July as operational threats, 
thereby missing chances to preempt the attacks. 
PREVENTION IN PRACTICE 
Collaboration 
The Prevention Cube treats collaboration as the basic building block of prevention. 
Though MI5 is most effective when it collaborates with the Special Branch police, the 
history of collaboration between the two agencies is a challenged one. As Peter Chalk 
and William Rosenau note, “areas of friction have arisen between the Security Service 
and local Special Branch police, particularly in instances in which MI5 case officers have 
moved to centrally sanitize intelligence gathered from covert human sources employed 
in joint-owned operations.”16 
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Prior to the 7 July and 21 July attacks, MI5 recognized the existence of “home-grown” 
terrorists but gave little credibility to arguments that any operations threatened the UK. 
The focus prior to 7 July was on plots where key al Qaeda operatives were involved, 
largely originating from outside the United Kingdom. The 7 July and 21 July bombings 
refocused attention on the terrorist threat to the UK in several distinct ways. In their 
examination of the 7 July bombings, British authorities determined a need for more 
collaboration between MI5 and the Special Branches to help prevent future attacks by 
home-grown terrorists: 
More needs to be done to improve the way that the Security Service and Special 
Branches come together in a combined and coherent way to tackle the “home-
grown” threat. We welcome steps that are now being taken to achieve this 
although, given that the ‘home-grown’ threat had clearly already been recognized, 
we are concerned that more was not done sooner.17 
The overall shortcomings in effective collaboration before 7 July reached across the 
security and intelligence services, including the Security Service (MI5), the Secret 
Intelligence Service (SIS) or MI6, and the Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ). In particular, prior to 2005, the SIS provided insufficient intelligence coverage 
on countries like Pakistan where al Qaeda still maintains training camps. At the same 
time, the focus of MI5 investigations was largely on plots involving direct connections to 
al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan.  
All the terrorist attacks, except the most recent one, and the two disrupted plots, 
involved al Qaeda affiliates in Pakistan supplying key training and planning resources to 
those involved in the plots. Manfo Kwaku Asiedu, charged in the 21 July plot testified 
that Ibrahim, the leader of the 21 July attack, and Khan, the leader of the 7 July attack, 
were in Pakistan at the same time and planned the attacks there.18 In addition, 
Mohammed Junaid Babar, who was arrested in New York for planning attacks on 
financial institutions on the U.S. east coast, testified as part of a plea bargain that Khan 
traveled to the Pakistan border near Afghanistan in 2003 for terrorism training.19 
The relationship between the U.K. and Pakistan is a complex one with a rich history. 
More than 400,000 people travel between the two countries each year. The Agencies do 
not know how many of those people continue their journey to Afghanistan or the tribal 
areas of Pakistan. Estimates are that as many as 4,000 Islamic extremists have attended 
camps in Afghanistan and returned.20 However, the pattern of attacks and disrupted 
plots indicates an overall coordination between Islamic extremists, al Qaeda or its 
affiliates, in Pakistan, and the home-grown terrorists of the UK. The pattern indicates 
an ongoing ability of al Qaeda to act as a network providing training and planning 
resources as well as an ideological source of motivation, without the exposure of a 
command and control hierarchy.21  
It is now clear MI5 knew about Khan well prior to 7 July, but failed to make key 
connections related to his activities. In early 2004, detainees from outside the UK 
referred to a man during questioning, known only through pseudonyms, who they 
claimed had traveled to Pakistan in 2003 seeking a meeting with al Qaeda leaders. MI5 
tried to establish the man’s identity but failed. As it turned out, Khan was the man. One 
of the detainees after 7 July identified a photograph taken of Khan at one of the 
meetings in 2004. Khan in fact did travel to Pakistan in 2003 and spent time there again 
with Tanweer from November 2004 to February 2005. Apparently, authorities did not 
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show the photograph to the detainee until after the 7 July attacks. The detainee then 
identified the person in the photograph as Khan. 
In other words, MI5 did not pursue specific opportunities to develop intelligence 
about Khan and Tanweer. In instances where it did develop intelligence on Khan from 
other ongoing investigations, MI5 did not pursue those opportunities. For example, MI5 
considered Khan and Tanweer peripheral to the Operation Crevice investigation. The 
judgment was accurate in quantitative terms, but telling and consequential in analytic 
terms.  
INFORMATION SHARING: THE UNKNOWN AS AN INFORMATION 
SOURCE 
Operation Crevice resulted from information provided by an employee at a rental-
storage business where the terrorist cell was storing the fertilizer for a bomb. He became 
suspicious and contacted the authorities. Similarly, following the 7 July and 21 July 
attacks, MI5 received a tip from a member of the Muslim community regarding an 
acquaintance thought to be involved in terrorist-related activity. MI5 started 
investigating the individual and, over time, the liquid bomb plot was uncovered. In fact, 
the investigators substituted a different chemical for the fertilizer during Operation 
Crevice, without the plotters’ discovering the switch. Applying the Prevention Cube (top 
side – Figure 1) suggests that this countermeasure was essentially a step to Protect 
against the threat capability posed by the plot even if the plotters executed the plan. 
Essentially, such a protective measure permitted MI5 to extend its investigation of a 
recognized Secondary Mode risk (right side – Figure 1) rather than intervene sooner 
to Preempt the threat posing the risk. Consider the following summary of Operation 
Crevice in the context of the Prevention Cube: 
In many ways both the primary and secondary modes are focused on making 
good use of time available to prevent and mitigate, rather than just respond to 
risk.…After initial surveillance it was decided the plotters were still in the process 
of gathering bomb elements. The risk was still in secondary mode. As a result, 
surveillance continued in order to identify all the plotters, their sources of 
support, and other operational details. The arrest was timed to ensure the risk 
did not enter the tertiary mode, but it was delayed to maximize the options 
available in the secondary mode.22 
The UK authorities also preempted the liquid bomb plot in August 2006 after months of 
intensive surveillance involving British, American, and Pakistani intelligence agencies. 
In other words, in the two most noted British successes in disrupting terrorist attacks, 
the prevention of the plots began with human intelligence from the public. Authorities 
knew the source of the information that initiated or bolstered the investigation. 
One of the major lessons learned from 7 July and 21 July is that opportunities to 
investigate the unknowns relating to a case require proactive intelligence practices. 
What is not known must be explored in order to make informed decisions about what 
needs to be learned. As the ISC report noted:*  
…the main lesson learned from the July attacks was the need to get into “the 
unknowns” – to find ways of broadening coverage to pick up currently unknown 
terrorist activity or plots. We were told that Security Service and police efforts 
prior to July were focused on following up known intelligence leads in the UK, 
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arising either out of other terrorist investigations, from GCHQ or the SIS, or from 
foreign intelligence reporting. Resources were fully consumed with the pursuit of 
existing leads and there was little capacity to look beyond to see where other 
threats might be developing. Steps are now being taken to develop a more 
proactive approach to identifying threats in the UK, first through *** and second 
through closer working with the police at the local level.23 
* The asterisks represent redaction 
The 7 July and 21 July attacks heightened recognition that much remains unknown 
about the ideologically motivated Islamist activity at the local level in the UK, and its 
relationship to al Qaeda affiliates in Pakistan. The focus since the attacks is on building 
a “rich picture” of local extremists using the police, MI5, and the police Special Branches 
working closely together. The Special Branches are a part of the police forces but also 
recruit and run agents for MI5. As noted previously, the relationship between the two 
has been difficult historically.  
The local constabulary funds the Special Branches and, in the past, that caused 
significant differences in their effectiveness from locale to locale. Since 7 July, an 
emphasis on national standards for the Special Branches is evident. The ISC report 
concludes: 
Special branches continue to vary in size and competence…. There is, moreover, 
no specific requirement for their Special Branches to meet a certain standard in 
the counter-terrorism work they do conduct in support of the Security Service…. 
The value of closer joint working between the Security Service and the police on a 
more local level is one of the key lessons to arise from the July attacks…. Where 
there may in the past have been a reluctance to give bad news and upset good 
relations, there appears, rightly, to be more determination post-July for problems 
or areas of weakness to be identified and resolved.24 
The Terrorism Act of 2006 made it a criminal offense to directly or indirectly encourage 
the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism or to disseminate 
terrorist publications, including statements or publications glorifying terrorism. The Act 
also broadened the legal basis for proscribing organizations that promote or encourage 
terrorism. Therefore, the local police and the Special Branches, as well as MI5, now 
possess extensive legal authority to gather intelligence from extremist groups and 
intervene using a variety of state powers, including extending the period of pre-charge 
detention from fourteen to twenty-eight days.25 Whether these new powers will make a 
difference in MI5’s decisions about investigating individuals who are peripheral to an 
ongoing investigation into high priority targets is an important question. 
Indeed, the 2007 bomb attacks in London on 29 June and Glasgow on 30 June point 
to continuing problems regarding MI5’s ability to recognize information with significant 
intelligence value. Bilal Abdulla and Mohammed Asha, who lived almost 300 miles 
apart, kept in regular contact, with their discussions intercepted by GCHQ and drawing 
the attention of MI5. However, the intelligence point of view on missed opportunities to 
learn about unknowns turns the criticism of failed assessment on its head. An 
intelligence source was quoted saying,  
The fact that these two had already been flagged up, albeit in a very minor 
capacity, is a great relief because it shows that we are doing our job. The 
nightmare scenario is a case when we get hold of someone or learn about 
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someone who has never before crossed our path. Then you have to start from 
scratch.26 
The point echoes the position taken by MI5 about its failure to give Khan and Tanweer 
higher priority as investigation targets before 7 July.  
MI5 noted that the links between Khan and Tanweer and the fertilizer bomb plotters 
represented less than 0.1 percent of all the links on record for Operation Crevice. 
Nevertheless, the ISC report’s point about exploring the unknowns in an investigation 
implies that the total quantity of links is not sufficient for determining whether an 
opportunity to investigate a peripheral target is reasonable. The context of the links 
means a lot as well. MI5 surveillance also linked Khan and Tanweer to the leader of the 
fertilizer bomb plot, Omar Khyam. That fact meant as much to Khan and Tanweer’s 
intelligence value as how many links existed between them and the fertilizer bomb 
plotters as a group. After all, Khyam was the known leader of the fertilizer bomb plot.  
A brief discussion of two key concepts from social network analysis (SNA) will clarify 
the point regarding the investigation of unknowns and the risk management strategy 
used by the Agencies. In its most basic form, social network analysis distinguishes 
between two types of centrality measures that appear relevant to the point, specifically 
degree centrality and betweenness centrality.27  
Degree Centrality 
Degree centrality is broken down in SNA according to in-degree centrality and out-
degree centrality. The former refers to the number of incoming links an individual has 
in a given relationship. The latter refers to the number of outgoing links an individual 
has in a given relationship. A social network with high degrees of both is a highly 
cohesive network for all members, resembling what John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt 
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Differences between in-degree and out-degree centrality occur in networks where some 
members are more connected to the network than others. Some members exert more 
influence on the network by having high out-degree centrality (e.g. Khan and Tanweer 
in Figure 3), whereas the network influences others who have high in-degree centrality 
(e.g. Lindsay and Hussein in Figure 3).29 
Betweenness Centrality 
MI5’s point that it decided not to continue surveillance of Khan and Tanweer because 
the quantity of Khan and Tanweer’s links to the fertilizer bomb plotters targeted in 
Operation Crevice were less than 0.1 percent of the total links fails to take into account 
the betweenness centrality of Khyam. Betweenness centrality refers to relationships 
where one individual provides the most direct connection between two or more groups. 
These individuals bridge networks, or subnetworks.30 In the case of Khan and Tanweer, 
Khyam was likely serving a liaison role rather than a broker role (Figure 3), meaning his 
betweenness was not likely critical to their plot but was indicative of Khan and 
Tanweer’s intelligence value. MI5 recognized the first point but apparently missed the 






Links existed between Khan and Tanweer to other members of the fertilizer bomb plot 
since MI5 observed them driving with the group. However, the open source intelligence 
indicates their connections with Khyam were denser, more frequent. Given Khyam’s 
leadership in the fertilizer bomb plot, of which authorities were aware, the repeated 
links MI5 observed between Khan and Tanweer to Khyam were significant when 
compared to their links to other members of the plot. 
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THREAT RECOGNITION 
Failing to recognize the threat that British nationals were capable of and likely to engage 
in suicide bombing was one of the major shortcomings of British authorities, specifically 
MI5, before 7 July 2005. This was despite the fact that Richard Reid, who tried to 
detonate a shoe bomb on an American Airlines flight to the United States, was a British 
citizen. The ISC report also states that Omar Sharif and Asif Hanif, two young British 
Muslims, tried to execute a suicide bomb attack against a bar in Tel Aviv in 2003. (The 
BBC corrected the point, noting that one of the bombers set off the device killing three 
people, while the other detonated later to avoid capture.)  
The Agencies did not adequately appreciate the threat posed by home-grown 
terrorists: 
We remain concerned that across the whole of the counter-terrorism community 
the development of the home-grown threat and the radicalisation of British 
citizens were not fully understood or applied to strategic thinking.31 
The Prevention Cube is helpful in sorting out the issues involved and providing a 
coherent interpretation of the developments. The threat from British nationals, willing 
to plan and execute suicide bomb attacks against iconic targets like the Tube, was in fact 
a recognized Primary Mode risk by the security agencies before 7 July.  
In other words, the Agencies recognized the Tube as a likely target for terrorists given 
the frequency of al Qaeda inspired terrorist attacks on mass transit, and the Madrid 
bombings of 2004. Yet, the protective measures taken mostly aimed to deter terrorists 
from attacking who were not engaging in suicide bombing. The video surveillance 
system in the Tube is one of the most extensive in the world. It was highly effective in 
permitting the authorities to determine who the suicide bombers were after the fact, but 
ineffective in deterring them from the attack.  
To some extent, one could reasonably surmise that the strategy and tactics of the 
PIRA, with its focus on volunteer safety, still dominated the counterterrorism thinking 
of the Agencies on deterrence before 7 July.  
The Agencies had intelligence from their own investigations and third parties that 
pointed in at least seven ways to the 7 July leader, Khan, as a higher priority figure than 
thought at the time. 
1. In his book, The One Percent Doctrine, Ron Suskind contends that Khan was 
planning to visit the United States in February 2003.32 Khan had done so 
three times since 2001. The CIA contacted the FBI to ask for a coordinated 
effort to track Khan’s movements and contacts. An NSA surveillance program 
recorded Khan’s communication with other Islamic extremists in the United 
States, with clear indications of an interest in mounting attacks in the U.S. 
Yet, according to Ron Suskind, the FBI and the CIA were unable to work out 
their differences over which agency would accept responsibility for Khan’s 
activities if he initiated an attack while in the country. In other words, neither 
agency wanted the responsibility of managing a Secondary Mode risk. As a 
result, the FBI placed Khan on a “no-fly” list the night before he was supposed 
to catch a flight to the United States. U.S. authorities reportedly told British 
officials of Khan’s plans and the decision to place him on a “no-fly” list and 
forwarded a detailed file.33  
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2. Khan and Tanweer met with the leader of the fertilizer bomb plot, Omar 
Khyam, at least five times in the weeks of the final planning stages of the plot. 
Khan and Tanweer were among a group of men meeting, where others at the 
meeting were under MI5 surveillance in 2004. MI5 considered Khayam a high 
level, or “essential,” target. “Essential” targets are highest priority with the 
most immediate claim on resources, with “desirable” targets second, and 
“other” last. The distinctions depend on the degree of affiliation to al Qaeda 
that the target is suspected of possessing. The meetings in 2004 were 
associated with the ongoing investigation in Operation Crevice.  
3. Khan and Tanweer were among fifty-five individuals considered worthy of 
follow up after the charges were filed against the fertilizer bomb plotters. 
Fifteen were considered essential to follow up, and forty were considered 
desirable. Khan and Tanweer were in the latter group. 
4. MI5 had also bugged a conversation between Khan and Omar Khyam, leader 
of the "fertilizer bomb" terrorists arrested as part of Operation Crevice. Court 
transcripts showed the two were discussing going to Pakistan to train as well 
as how to commit financial fraud to support their activities.34 
5. Khan and Tanweer were followed while driving with the fertilizer bomb 
plotters and took anti-surveillance precautions. The Agencies followed the car 
that Khan ultimately drove to his home. 
6. In March 2004, the authorities checked the ownership of the vehicle Khan 
drove and found it was registered to his wife. Two months later, another 
ownership check showed it registered to Khan under a different address. 
7. Clear evidence from surveillance tapes showed Khan was planning on 
acquiring terrorism training overseas and discussing specific attack plans. 
The ISC report indicates that, at the time, MI5’s assessment suggested Khan and 
Tanweer’s focus was training and insurgency operations in Pakistan, and schemes to 
defraud financial institutions. However, we now know that MI5 did not give the ISC a 
full accounting of how much it knew about Khan in particular.  
More recently, Shadow Home Secretary David Davis questioned the Home Secretary, 
John Reid about MI5’s failure to disclose all the relevant information. 
It seems that MI5 taped Mohammad Sidique Khan talking about his wish to fight 
in the jihad and saying his goodbyes to his family -- a clear indication that he was 
intending a suicide mission....[H]e was known to have attended late-stage 
discussions on planning another major terror attack. Again, I ask the Home 
Secretary whether that is true.35 
Mr. Reid indicated the question was relevant but declined to answer it. We now know 
Khan was a threat posing a Secondary Mode risk that developed over a period from 
2003 while he organized the other three members for the 7 July attacks. Additionally, 
the ISC reports that the intelligence services now believe Khan met with al Qaeda during 
his visit to Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2003. A Secondary Mode risk occurs when 
there are early signals of a specific threat emerging. As noted above, there were at least 
seven points of intelligence indicating that Khan posed a terrorist threat.  
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MI5 made a similar series of omissions and judgments about the leader of the 
unsuccessful 21 July bomb attacks, Muktar Said Ibrahim.  
1. Ibrahim was photographed in May 2004 at a jihadi training camp in the 
north-west of England. As the Times noted, Ibrahim aroused suspicion from 
his association with Rauf Mohammed who actively supported the insurgency 
in Iraq. Mohammed drove Ibrahim and two traveling companions to the 
airport in December 2004 as they flew to Pakistan for terrorist training.36  
2. The association with Mohammed resulted in Ibrahim and his traveling 
companions being questioned at the airport by Special Branch police.  
3. Ibrahim was arrested at an extremist bookstall in London for scuffling with a 
policeman over extremist literature Ibrahim was distributing, and an 
outstanding warrant for his arrest was issued for failing to show in court on a 
public order offense.  
4. Ibrahim was given a British passport and allowed to leave the country despite 
a prior criminal record and an outstanding warrant. Officers found a large 
amount of cash, mountain gear, and a first-aid manual with marked passages 
on treating gunshot wounds. Ibrahim was permitted to leave after explaining 
he was going to Pakistan to attend a wedding.  
5. MI5 received an alert upon Ibrahim’s return to the UK in early 2005. It 
considered him a low-key target and missed the fact that he was recruiting a 
cell of suicide bombers.  
On July 21, 2005, Ibrahim attempted to blow up the No. 26 bus. His accomplices, Yassin 
Omar, Hussein Osman, and Ramzi Mohammed also failed in their bomb attempts. 
Luckily, none of the devices exploded. 
A Tertiary Mode risk poses imminent harm from a recognized, specific threat. 
MI5 now believes Khan and Tanweer underwent operational training while in Pakistan. 
Moreover, leading up to the attack, during the tertiary risk period, Khan was in contact 
on over 200 calls from his phone to various phone booths and mobile phones in 
Pakistan. Interestingly, the ISC report did not criticize the Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) for failing to consider the pattern of contacts 
significant. Although the ISC report did not spell out exactly how the security service 
plans to go about it, the future focus is on an increasingly proactive strategy using a 
network analysis approach.* 
Security Service and police efforts prior to July were focused on following up 
known intelligence leads in the UK, arising either out of other terrorist 
investigations, from GCHQ or the SIS, or from foreign intelligence reporting. 
Resources were fully consumed with the pursuit of existing leads and there was 
little capacity to look beyond to see where other threats might be developing. 
Steps are now being taken to develop a more proactive approach to identifying 
threats in the UK, first through *** and second through closer working with the 
police at the local level. The potential value of *** and *** as a means for 
identifying new threats has been highlighted to the Committee. The fact that the 7 
July group was in contact with others under Security Service investigation has 
emphasised the potential for new threats to be identified through the 
examination of information and contact networks relating to existing targets. 
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Greater capacity to *** to generate new leads is being developed within the 
Security Service.37 
* The asterisks represent redaction 
As part of the overall proactive strategy, a discussion of whether to change the law and 
allow authorities to use intercepted communication as evidence is underway. Drawing 
from the U.S. experience, the director of public prosecutions contends that using 
intercepts as evidence will increase terrorism prosecutions and drive up the percent of 
guilty pleas, making control orders less necessary.38 The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 
2005 authorized the secretary of state, under judicial oversight, to issue a control order 
to place one or more obligations on individuals to prevent, restrict, or disrupt their 
involvement in terrorism-related activity. The obligations can include curfews, 
restrictions on use of communications equipment, restrictions on personal associations 
with others, and travel restrictions.39  
Some observers, citing patterns of prosecution in the United States, contend that 
allowing intercepts as evidence will decrease the need to use control orders by 
increasing guilty pleas, thereby allowing more prosecutions. 40 The Baroness Scotland of 
Asthal, Patricia Janet Scotland, a barrister and attorney general for England and Wales, 
a ministerial position in the British Government, disagrees with the contention that 
using intercepts as evidence will increase prosecutions. On the contrary, Baroness 
Scotland contends that,  
It is sometimes argued that if only we could produce intercept evidence against 
terrorists we would be able to lock more of them up and avoid measures such as 
control orders. That is simply untrue. The last review concluded that there would 
be, I emphasize, very limited utility against terrorists.41 
It is unclear how the policy issue of using intercepts as evidence will develop. Allowing 
intercepts to qualify as evidence raises a range of issues that come from long-standing 
traditions involving the relationship of MI5 to the Special Branches and the local 
constabulary. Allowing intercepted communication to count as evidence at trial might 
well result in the UK preempting threats earlier in their development, effectively 
reducing the Agencies’ timeframe for managing Secondary Mode risks.  
RISK MANAGEMENT 
One of the inherent challenges of prevention is the impossibility of preventing all 
adverse events. Judgments made at specific points in time influence what threats 
authorities recognize, and the conceptual framework in which they assess risk. The most 
important thing is to base those judgments on good information and a full recognition of 
the threats, known and, to the extent possible, unknown. Allowing previous 
assessments of a target’s priority to determine how new opportunities, i.e. linkages, to 
investigate the target are managed tends to preclude, or at least minimize, a concern 
with the unknown. The 7 July attackers benefited from that overall counterterrorism 
strategy, as did those involved in the 21 July attack.   
In addition to MI5 hierarchically organizing investigative targets according to 
whether they are “essential,” “desirable,” or “other,” the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre 
(JTAC) also introduced an analogous three-tier, hierarchical model in early 2005 
regarding the degrees of connection between targets and al Qaeda leadership:  
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Tier 1 described individuals or networks thought to have direct links to al Qaeda.  
Tier 2 described individuals or networks loosely affiliated with al Qaeda.  
Tier 3 described individuals or networks inspired by al Qaeda ideology.  
In May 2005, JTAC considered the majority of its focus on individuals and groups from 
Tiers 2 and 3 only loosely affiliated to al Qaeda or entirely separate (albeit with shared 
ideological beliefs). JTAC considered the group responsible for the Madrid bombings in 
2004 a Tier 3 group. 
The Agencies used tiered designations to prioritize resource expenditure, but none of 
these hierarchies took into account the relevance of unknown factors. If investigators 
had kept in mind a network conception of al Qaeda organization, rather than directing 
activities through hierarchical assessments driven by what was “known,” different 
decisions might have led them to discover what Khan and Tanweer were up to. The ISC 
report reaches the same conclusion in a more indirect way: 
The chances of identifying attack planning and of preventing the 7 July attacks 
might have been greater had different investigative decisions been taken in 
2003–2005. Nonetheless, we conclude that, in light of the other priority 
investigations being conducted and the limitations on Security Service resources, 
the decisions not to give greater investigative priority to these two individuals 
were understandable.42 
In other words, the ISC and government reports agree that scarcity of resources, rather 
than mistaken decisions about risk, was the main reason MI5 did not investigate the two 
men, though it indicates that the investigative decisions made during the crucial time 
period between 2003 and 2005 could have affected the outcome.  
MI5 allocated resources to investigate Khan and Tanweer late in 2004, probably 
because they were among the fifty-five individuals deemed to merit follow up after 
Operation Crevice. However, MI5 soon diverted the funding to investigations considered 
higher priority. Yet, a number of experts question whether the ISC report’s focus on 
resources was adequate to develop an understanding of how MI5 decision making went 
wrong.  
A number of experts are increasingly frustrated by the concentration on the 
numbers game in the aftermath of the attacks. “To say that the intelligence 
services are exonerated and were hampered by lack of resources really says 
nothing of substance,” said Mike Smith, an intelligence expert at King's College, 
London. “One can have vast resources and still make mistakes, miss out what is 
going on and fail to connect the dots - think of the failure of the vast intelligence 
resources in the US to anticipate the 9/11 attacks.” The assessment of Anthony 
Glees, a renowned intelligence-watcher from Brunel University, is even more 
emphatic. He told Scotland on Sunday: "MI5 seems to have wanted it both ways: 
first of all punters like myself learned from our sources that the problem had 
been one of 'resources'. But just a few days ago, I was told that resources were 
not the problem - the problem had been one of failed assessment. If it had been 
'resources' it would have prompted the next question: 'Did you ask Gordon 
Brown for more cash?' But I am told they did not ask for more cash in 2005 
because they were more or less satisfied with what they had.”43 
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Regardless of MI5’s view of its need for resources in 2005, the service has since 
increased its overall staff significantly. Yet MI5’s methods for establishing who is a high 
priority target, and who isn’t, were only indirectly assessed by the ISC report.  
Nevertheless, the decision not to give Khan and Tanweer greater priority at the time 
points to a failure on the part of investigators’ assessment of their importance. The 
investigations failed to recognize that individuals connected on multiple occasions with 
other, higher priority, individuals under active surveillance present opportunities to 
learn about unknown threats, i.e. nodes in a network, that increase the lower priority 
target’s intelligence value.  
It is reasonable to assume that the Agencies’ experience with PIRA informed efforts 
against al Qaeda since, even after PIRA restructured itself from a hierarchical, military 
style organization to a group of loosely-coupled cells in the 1980s, high profile attacks 
on UK government officials that required special teams were still typically controlled 
directly by the GHC [General Headquarters].44 Similarly, al Qaeda operational leaders 
based in Afghanistan largely directed the attacks on 9/11.45 The 7 July attack 
demonstrated that the kind of direct coordination informing the counterterrorism 
strategy of the Agencies was insufficient to detect the emerging threat from home-grown 
terrorist attacks by Islamic extremists.  
It appears that authorities now recognize the importance of thinking in network 
analysis terms as well as hierarchical priority structures when considering the relative 
importance of targets in a terrorism investigation. MI5 still contends it cannot follow up 
100 percent of the individuals it comes across that are peripheral to an investigation, but 
security sources are quoted saying that figures peripheral to investigations are 
constantly reassessed currently.46 As we noted above, individuals considered peripheral, 
yet connected with leaders of other ongoing plots, offer increased intelligence value 
since those leaders’ betweenness status can indicate a broker or liaison role. 
INTERVENTION 
MI5 did not develop intelligence to allow it to make a decision to intervene against the 
attackers of 7 July or 21 July. The risk-management strategy largely precluded 
development of intervention opportunities. The ISC and government reports contend 
that, if more resources had been in place, authorities might have had more information 
to share, leading to better threat recognition, and a risk-management decision that was 
more in line with the actual threat. The result might have been an opportunity to 
intervene. 
The story of what was known about the 7 July group prior to July indicates 
that if more resources had been in place sooner the chances of preventing 
the July attacks could have increased. Greater coverage in Pakistan, or 
more resources generally in the UK, might have alerted the Agencies to the 
intentions of the 7 July group.47 
Our analysis indicates that the experience of dealing with PIRA conditioned the risk 
management strategy the Agencies used to investigate threats posed by al Qaeda. In the 
case of PIRA, a hierarchical command structure remained in control for strategic attacks 
on members of the UK government, even after PIRA restructured itself into operational 
cells. Al Qaeda operations in the UK appear to follow a different pattern. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This article used the Prevention Cube to identify patterns of terrorism prevention in the 
United Kingdom since 2004. It discussed successful attack plots and preempted attack 
plots using the key concepts of the Prevention Cube to think through the assumptions 
made by the Agencies in the UK regarding the risks posed by the terrorist threat of al 
Qaeda. 
The discussion suggested that the experience with PIRA conditioned the Agencies in 
the UK to think hierarchically about risks posed by terrorist threats. A different risk 
management strategy informed by social network analysis could have affected the 
assessments made in Operation Crevice regarding which individuals to pursue on the 
periphery of those investigations. Khan and Tanweer, though peripheral to the fertilizer 
bomb plot, were key leaders in the 7 July terrorist attack.  
As a heuristic device, the Prevention Cube does not predict the conditions under 
which collaboration, information sharing, or threat recognition explain the success of a 
particular risk management strategy or intervention decision. Rather, the Prevention 
Cube provides an exemplar for guiding risk management. It informs an adaptive 
strategy for efforts to collaborate, share information, and recognize threats in each 
decision to intervene to protect, deter, or preempt risks posed.  
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In Catastrophe: Risk and Response, Richard Posner makes the case that the risk 
of global catastrophe is higher than most people think, and he analyzes the 
reasons why the U.S. under-prepares for natural, technological, and terrorist 
catastrophe. Attempts to mitigate the risk of catastrophe will incur heavy costs, 
whether economic (as in proposals to reduce the effects of climate change) or 
civic (as in policing reforms that infringe on civil liberties). How might the U.S. 
and the world weigh the extraordinary costs and uncertain future benefits of 
avoiding catastrophe? Posner advocates economic tools, especially cost-benefit 
analysis, as a guide in determining which catastrophes are worth protecting 
against and which are so unlikely to happen or so trivial that they are not worth 
the cost of defense.  
Catastrophe is a central work in the burgeoning literature on how to deal with 
rare but high-consequence events. Long the domain of engineers, statisticians, 
and the reinsurance industry, the unique properties of rare, high-impact events 
drew attention after the attacks of September 11 and Hurricane Katrina. Nassim 
Taleb’s recent bestseller, The Black Swan, documents the unpredictable nature of 
rare, high-consequence events.1 He shows how traditional “Gaussian” statistics 
use past events to predict future ones according to the properties of the bell 
curve. With rare events, however, we do not know the underlying properties that 
define the curve. Mapping these non-linear relationships proves difficult. 
Recent work in behavioral economics shows that people have trouble 
calculating risks. They often wildly over- or under-estimate numbers, but rarely 
provide a large enough margin of error.2  When social scientists bother to check 
the predictions of “experts,” of when and where international political events 
such as revolutions and wars are to take place, the experts fare little better than 
chance.3 Most historically important events are impossible to predict with 
confidence.  
We know that disasters will occur, just not precisely when. Scholars from a 
variety of disciplines have documented the myriad reasons people fail to take 
steps to reduce the damage caused by inevitable disasters. Sociologists focus on 
macro-level trends such as urbanization that lead to high concentrations of 
people and resources attractive to terrorists and vulnerable to accident and 
disaster.4 Another line of inquiry examines the components of “social 
vulnerability” in race, class, and gender.5 Disasters affect different social groups 
in different ways, and identifying patterns of how particular groups respond to 
disasters can help mitigate consequences. The elderly, for example, may lack 
social networks to help them evacuate.   
Political scientists, as a rule, analyze the political incentives behind 
intervention in disaster policy. The system of presidential disaster declarations 
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suits the federal nature of U.S. government by providing a role for governors in 
the request process, but it also provides few incentives for presidents to limit 
disaster spending.6 Other studies examine how entrepreneurial bureaucracies 
such as FEMA attempt to find a mission and build capacities to meet that 
mission, sometimes running into conflict with the short-term goals of 
politicians.7  
Posner’s work, however, descends from the macro level of social and 
institutional theory to the individual, drawing on the literature of economics to 
understand how individuals think about the risk of rare events. Catastrophe 
locates the source of disaster risk in individual behavior such as living in 
floodplains, not purchasing insurance, or not taking the possibility of 
technological accidents seriously. Posner’s contribution is to synthesize the 
literature in economics and cognitive psychology to explain the obstacles to 
efficient risk calculation imposed by the human mind.  
Most people have difficulty thinking about abstract probabilities as opposed to 
events they have observed. Human mental capacity is limited, and startling 
events such as the attacks of September 11 trigger our attention. But evaluating 
risk requires paying attention to what we do not see. There has been surprisingly 
little attention in the popular media given to pandemic flu, even though influenza 
killed approximately twenty million people in 1918-1919. The disease has no cure, 
and vaccines are difficult to produce because of the mutability of the virus. People 
from all walks of life pay greater attention to issues in recent memory and tend to 
give greater weight to confirmatory evidence; the cumulative effect is to under-
prepare for catastrophe.   
MANY THREATS 
Posner makes a persuasive case that the risk of global catastrophe is growing. 
Some critics emphasize the increase in the perception of risk in industrialized 
Western nations, but Posner explains why objective risk is on the rise.8 New 
technologies such as nuclear power and high-energy physics are potentially more 
destructive than technologies of the industrial era. Urbanization concentrates 
targets and terrorist groups have more destructive weapons and a greater global 
reach than ever before. To some degree, these risks compound. Terrorists can 
mimic natural disasters by, for example, destroying dams to cause flooding. 
Global warming contributes to the loss of biodiversity. The likelihood of these 
risks is so slight that people have trouble taking them seriously, unless one of 
them has been realized in recent memory. Americans worry about terrorist 
attacks, and the U.S. government devotes millions to preventing and protecting 
against terrorism, even thought the risk is quite small.  
While some critics have argued that the risk of terrorism has been vastly 
overstated, Posner acknowledges that the threat is serious. He, however, wants to 
put it in perspective by comparing terrorism to a host of other risks.  Some of his 
suggestions seem to come from a science fiction movie. For example, he worries 
that high energy physics experiments could trigger a “strangelet scenario” in 
which a chain reaction condenses the earth into a tiny ball.  
The book’s wide range of scenarios, from global terrorism to global warming 
and asteroid collision, suggest what a truly all hazards approach might mean. The 
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Department of Homeland Security (DHS) attempts to reconcile preparation for 
natural disasters and terrorist attacks in “all hazards” plans, but these represent 
only a narrow range of catastrophic threats, or dangers, that could lead to 
massive loss of life and property in a concentrated period of time. 
One possibility for the future, undeveloped in this book, is for DHS to morph 
into a department of risk assessment in which it analyzes a range of threats and 
devotes resources to reducing vulnerabilities. While Posner usefully identifies 
risks that threaten the American way of life, he neglects some disasters that are 
costly, because of their frequency, but are not catastrophic. Floods cause billions 
in damage each year, and the total cost over time could reach that of a 
catastrophic disaster, depending on the threshold.9 A department of risk 
assessment might address frequent small but cumulatively costly disasters as well 
as rare but catastrophic ones.  
Posner’s focus on catastrophic disasters highlights their global nature. A 
“strangelet” scenario, asteroid collision, or global warming would harm, and 
perhaps extinguish, the entire planet. Remedies for catastrophic disasters require 
global coordination because one country’s vulnerability increases the 
vulnerability of every other country. The “global war on terror” adopts some of 
this logic, and homeland security experts advocate globalizing security by 
locating port facilities abroad and increasing cooperation in screening for 
dangerous materials overseas.10 Though he is often associated with limited-
government libertarians politically, Posner’s analytic law and economics 
approach here leads to the proposal for a new bureaucracy, an international 
version of the Environmental Protection Agency. One nation’s actions affect the 
rest of the planet, he argues, and just as a national agency regulates 
environmental protection among states, an international agency could provide 
information and regulate standards to reduce the cost of global warming or loss 
of species among nations.  
COSTS AND BENEFITS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 
Recognizing the most serious risks is one problem, but figuring out what to do 
about them is another. Airport baggage screeners and law enforcement fusion 
centers may interdict terrorist attempts, but at a cost. How much is enough? 
Global warming provides a hard case for determining how much to spend on 
prevention and mitigation because the threat is highly uncertain. Posner’s 
analysis begins with a sober recognition of the problem. “No species has so 
stressed the environment as modern human beings are doing, and at an 
accelerating pace as China, India, Brazil, and other large, poor countries 
modernize rapidly,” he writes. “The human impact on the climactic equilibrium is 
inherently unpredictable.” (p. 50) Scientific experts who publish in peer-reviewed 
journals have reached a near-consensus that the climate is growing hotter, which 
exacerbates other threats such as loss of species and political instability. Posner 
favors a conservative approach that reduces the human impact on the 
environment, but cautions that the costs of intervention should not outweigh the 
benefits. In other words, it may be easier to accept the inevitability of climate 
change but slow its effects by taxing emissions to reduce pollution and funding 
new agricultural programs for countries in which climate change disrupts the 
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food supply. Whether it is better to address the causes of global warming or the 
effects, Siberia will not become the breadbasket for the world without a high cost. 
Cost-benefit analysis provides more accurate predictions of doomsday 
scenarios than science fiction, and it can provide helpful guidelines for decision-
making because, as Posner shows, human intuition does not produce optimal 
results. But in his zeal for applying cost-benefit analysis, Posner understates the 
uncertainty found in the world. We know that catastrophic bioterrorism and 
global warming pose threats, but we do not know their likelihood. We can 
calculate the consequences of, for example, a nuclear explosion but we cannot 
fully calculate risk because we do not know the underlying probabilities of a 
terrorist attack. We cannot even predict where and when an earthquake will 
strike, or how many will strike the U.S. in a single year and of what magnitude. 
The earth’s physical processes remain mysterious and contingent, and predicting 
the behavior of human-caused disasters is even more challenging.  
 The Department of Homeland Security confronts uncertainty in attempting to 
adopt a “risk-based” strategy trumped by department leaders.11 The basic DHS 
strategy document released in spring 2005, the National Preparedness 
Guidance, is based on fifteen scenarios, including a major hurricane and a dirty 
bomb attack.12 These represent “worst-cases” rather than a pure risk-based 
strategy because there is no way to calculate the probabilities of each of these 
scenarios with accuracy. We simply do not know the likelihood of a bioterrorism 
attack in the next year.  
Estimating complex processes such as global warming, loss of species, and the 
“strangelet scenario” that are affected by the development of new technology is 
even more complicated. Scientific progress could either mitigate risk by creating 
clean energy or exacerbate risk by producing new technology with catastrophic 
possibilities. The best theories of invention portray it as a semi-random process 
similar to natural selection.13 There is simply no way to predict the future impact 
of technology on the risk of a particular disaster with certainty. Faced with 
uncertainty, Posner recommends a conservative approach. He proposes a 
regulatory body to screen scientists, especially foreign ones, and to review 
potentially dangerous technologies. He also recommends more science education 
so that citizens will have the acumen and the interest to question whether 
research and development is worth the cost, rather than allowing the scientific 
establishment to proceed on its own.  
With Catastrophe, Posner brings his often witty, sometimes counterintuitive 
economic rationality to bear on thinking about high consequence rare events and 
the costs of humans’ unprecedented impact on the natural environment. Posner 
is the author of more than twenty books and, according to one list, the seventieth 
most frequently cited public intellectual. (Granted, he compiled the list).  
As with rare events, what readers do not get in Catastrophe may be as 
important as what they are offered. The book shows what it might mean to think 
about allocating resources among a wide variety of catastrophic risks, a truly all 
hazards approach, but it neglects the institutional politics that have bedeviled 
homeland security. DHS has struggled to define what it should protect, whether 
government sites, private buildings, or networks that perform essential functions 
such as power generation and transportation. In addition, the department lacks a 
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single approach to what it should protect against, and the question of what 
homeland security really is remains open. FEMA prepares for natural disasters 
(though most capacities rest with state and localities) while the Secret Service, for 
example, worries about crime and terrorist acts. A host of other potential 
catastrophes are outside the mission of DHS.  
If homeland security is to last as a concept, it will have to include more than 
preparation for the last terrorist attack. Posner’s approach to cost-benefit 
analysis provides a starting point for thinking about how to allocate resources 
among threats, a task that does not come easily (or naturally, if we accept 
Posner’s premises borrowed from evolutionary biology). To go further, DHS will 
have to institutionalize risk assessment and provide clear guidance to states, 
localities, private industry, and even politicians about what risks are worth 
preparing for and how. Cost-benefit analysis is a not a self-enforcing process. 
Instead, it is a tool that can help discipline the unavoidably messy process of 
deciding which risks to prepare for.   
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